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ABSTRACT 
 
 Although there is extensive theoretical and empirical coverage of the incentive eﬀect of 
an income tax on labor supply in the economics literature, there is no study of the secondary 
behavioral eﬀects of an income tax. In this thesis, I explore the relationship among income, 
marginal income tax, and body weight. Namely, I show that under general conditions the Engel 
curve for the optimal weight is an inverted U-shaped function and the effect of the marginal 
income tax upon weight is non-linear. The empirical investigation uses two datasets: a panel 
dataset with 459 state-level observations for US states from 1992 to 2000 and a micro-level 
dataset from the 2006 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) with 184,042 
observations for 1145 counties and 50 states. The fixed eﬀect estimation of the panel dataset 
suggests that the estimate of the eﬀect of the marginal income tax rate on the conditional mean of 
BMI ranges from 0.20 to 0.36 under various specifications. The results of the mixed multilevel 
model indicate a strong and positive statistical association between the marginal income tax rate 
and BMI. The quantile regression analysis indicates that size of the effect is substantially greater 
at the upper quantiles of BMI, especially for the females.  
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 CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In April 2005, Flegal et al. published a detailed analysis of obesity-related deaths in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association. Their study reduced the number of deaths in the 
US attributable to obesity to 111,909 from the CDC’s initial estimate of 414,000. The ensuing 
controversy led to new research across various scientific fields. This thesis is a modest addition 
to the existing literature. I propose two rational-choice models of obesity and derive a 
relationship between tax policy and an individual’s decision to become obese. The first model 
implies that a rising marginal tax rate on income reduces the available budget for purchasing 
healthier foods and increases the time available for sedentary activities, thereby increasing the 
optimal weight. The second model implies that a rising income tax rate induces people to 
substitute to lower quality foods available at lower prices, and reduces the amount of home-
prepared meals. The extra time available from not working at home encourages a sedentary life 
style, which also leads to more weight gain.  
Obesity has become a priority for many public interest groups. Recent trends indicate an 
increase in the number of obese people in the United States for all age groups, races, and 
genders. A three-fold increase in the median percentage of overall obese people in the past 30 
years is good reason for concern. But the scientific causes and consequences of obesity based on 
the Body Mass Index are far from clear (Kragelund and Olmland 2005). Pursuing policies based  
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on weak causal relationships may lead to inappropriate policy prescriptions and behavioral 
responses to them. For example, it is widely accepted among the public that sedentary behavior 
is the primary reason why our children are gaining weight at a disturbing rate. The experimental 
study by Wilkin et al. (2006) shows that physical activity among children had very little 
correlation with environmental changes; it was instead driven by children’s individual decisions 
as to how to expend energy.  
This study markedly diﬀers from existing works in terms of its objectives. The purpose of 
this thesis is to bring tax policy variables into the picture and investigate how they contribute to 
the individual’s optimal choice to be overweight. Another key distinction of this study from the 
existing economic literature on obesity is the underlying biological assumption regarding 
obesity. The current theoretical literature on obesity is based on the assumption that the volume 
of food consumed drives weight gain. The models in this paper are based on the assumptions 
grounded in medical and nutritional findings that energy density is more important than the 
volume of food in explaining obesity. 
Using two distinct datasets, a panel dataset with 459 state-level observations for the US 
states from 1992 to 2000 and a micro-level dataset from the 2006 Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System (BRFSS) with 184,042 observations for 1145 counties and 50 states, I 
estimate the eﬀects of the marginal income tax rate on the state-level and individual-level Body 
Mass Index (BMI). The fixed eﬀect estimation of the panel dataset suggests that the marginal 
income tax variable is statistically and economically significant. The estimate of the eﬀect of a 
one-percent change in the marginal income tax rate on the conditional mean of BMI ranges from 
0.20 to 0.36 under diﬀerent specifications. For further robustness checks, quantile regression is 
employed. The results of the quantile regression suggest that BMI responses to the marginal 
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income tax are non-linear and the eﬀect is greater at the upper quantiles of BMI. As the 2006 
BRFSS dataset, in addition to invidual level variables, also contains county level variables, a 
random intercept multi-level linear model is employed. The results of the multi-level model 
using the state-level marginal income tax rate variable suggest that the eﬀect of the marginal tax 
is non-linear, and it is found to be statistically insignificant in some specifications. 
Using the individual characteristics and income from the BRFSS dataset, I generated 
simulated individual-level marginal income tax rates from the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search’s TAXSIM9 program. The results of re-estimating the multilevel model by controlling for 
individual specific, state-level, and county-level variables indicate a strong positive statistical 
association between the marginal income tax rate and the BMI. The quantile regression method 
based analysis shows that the eﬀect is substantially greater at the upper quantiles of BMI, 
especially for females. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II will review the secular 
trends in obesity across states, outline weaknesses of the BMI as a measure of obesity, review the 
economic literature on obesity, and discuss the relevant findings in nutrition science. Chapter III 
presents two theoretical models of rational weight-gaining behavior and the implications of 
changes in marginal income tax rate on the optimal weight. Chapter IV summarizes the datasets 
used in the empirical analysis. Chapter V discusses the choice of statistical models and 
techniques employed in the empirical analysis. Chapter VI describes the variables used in the 
analysis. Chapter VII presents and interprets the results of the econometric model estimations. 
Chapter VIII concludes with a discussion of the results and their relevance to policy makers. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1. Obesity Trends in the United States 
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines a person to be obese 
if he or she has a Body Mass Index (BMI) that exceeds 30, where BMI is measured as body 
weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. Although the BMI is not the best 
indicator of one's healthy weight as in the case of former Governor Schwarzenegger, it is the 
most commonly used measurement unit.1 
Why has the American public become so obsessed with the obesity problem? According 
to the 2003-2004 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), approximately 
66 percent of U.S. adults are either overweight or obese and 32.2 percent are obese. Table 1 
shows the prevalence of overweight (25 < BMI < 30), obesity (30 < BMI < 40), and extreme 
obesity (BMI > 40) in the United States over time. The growth rate of obesity is staggering: from 
1960 to 2005 the percentage of obese people increased almost three-fold and the percentage of 
extremely obese people increased by more than six-fold. Surprisingly, the percentage of 
overweight people has not changed much over this period.  
Similar trends are observed around the world. The World Health Organization (WHO 
2003) called it a global problem of “epidemic proportions”.2 The most visible change in the rates 
                                                          
1
 The Governator’s BMI, in his athletic prime, is believed to have been 33.45. Source: Menscience. Retrieved June 
5, 2010, from http://www.menscience.com/Fight-Your-Bulge-with-Brains-_ep_106.html. 
2
 Retrieved December 19, 2010, from http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/media/en/gsfs_obesity.pdf 
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of obesity is observed among children in developed as well as in developing nations. According 
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Health Data for 2010, the US 
has the highest prevalence of obesity and extreme obesity among the member countries. 
The obesity rates vary significantly across the regions within the United States. Table 2 
shows regional data on the percentages of obese people. The states in New England have the 
lowest percentage of obese people and the states in East South Central region have the highest 
percentage of obese people (17% vs. 23%). All regions had about a two-fold increase in the 
percentage of obese adults from 1991 to 2000. The relative rank order, however, did not change 
significantly over this period. 
The regional variation in obesity prevalence may be driven by race and ethnicity. Table 3 
shows the percentage of adults who are classified as obese for each state. Based on the table, the 
averages are 24% for non-Hispanic Caucasians, 35% for African-Americans, and 28% for 
Hispanics. Furthermore, there is a significant variation across states for all races and ethnicities. 
For example, among Caucasians, the residents of Colorado were the fittest (16.2%), while the 
residents of West Virginia were the heaviest (30.2%). Among African-Americans, the residents 
of New Hampshire were the fittest (23%), while the residents of Maine were on the heavy side 
(45.1%). Among Hispanics, the residents of Maryland were the fittest (21%), while the residents 
of Tennessee were the heaviest (36.7%). The distribution of obesity across the states for African-
Americans was concentrated in the Southeast and South Central regions; the CDC's Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System survey results indicate that in 1997 seven out of the ten heaviest 
states were in those two regions. Among Hispanics, the distribution of obesity was concentrated 
heavily in the Southwest and Midwest regions of the United States.
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Table 1. Prevalence of Overweight, Obese, and Extremely Obese among US Adults 
BMI 
Intervals  
1960-62 1971-74 1976-80 1988-94 1999-2000 2001-02 2003-04 2005-06 
n=6,126 n=12,911 n=11,765 n=14,468 n=3,603 n=3,916 n=3,756 n=3,835 
25 < BMI < 30 31.5 32.3 32.1 32.7 33.6 34.4 33.4 32.2 
30 < BMI < 40 13.4 14.5 15 23.2 30.9 31.3 32.9 35.1 
BMI  > 40 0.9 1.3 1.4 3.0 5.0 5.4 5.1 6.2 
Source: CDC, Prevalence of overweight, obesity and extreme obesity among adults: United States, trends 1976-80 through 
2005-2006 (Table 2), 2008. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Percentage of  Obese Adults in the US by Region 
 Year New England 
Mid-
Atlantic 
East North 
Central 
West North 
Central 
East South 
Central 
West South 
Central Mountain Pacific 
1991 (%) 9.9 12.7 14.1 12.2 13.1 13.1 9.6 10.2 
1998 (%) 11.4 16.7 19.1 18.0 20.0 20.0 14.1 17.0 
2000 (%) 16.9 18.4 21.0 19.8 23.1 22.2 17.1 19.1 
Source: CDC, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 1991 - 2000.  
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Table 3. State-specific Percentage of Adults Aategorized as Obese by Race, 
2006−2008 
State/Area White 
African-
American Hispanic   
Alabama 27.3   40.4   29.0   
Alaska 25.0   30.8   30.8   
Arizona 21.7   35.9   31.4   
Arkansas 27.1   37.6   25.5   
California 19.8   34.3   29.2   
Colorado 16.2   26.2   25.1   
Connecticut 19.9   31.2   24.6   
Delaware 24.3   39.2   29.0   
Florida 20.9   35.1   26.0   
Georgia 23.5   36.0   26.1   
Illinois 23.4   33.3   30.7   
Indiana 26.1   35.7   26.6   
Iowa 25.5   35.7   27.5   
Kansas 25.7   39.8   31.7   
Kentucky 27.4   38.5   27.0   
Louisiana 24.9   35.9   24.4   
Maine 23.6   45.1   27.8   
Maryland 22.4   34.0   21.0   
Massachusetts 20.0   30.0   27.1   
Michigan 26.2   37.4   31.2   
Minnesota 24.3   32.5   27.9   
Mississippi 27.6   40.4   26.0   
Missouri 26.5   36.1   28.8   
Nebraska 25.7   35.9   29.0   
Nevada 22.8   28.7   29.1   
New Hampshire 22.9   23.0   32.3   
New Jersey 21.9   33.0   24.1   
New Mexico 19.5   31.9   27.6   
New York 22.8   29.7   27.1   
North Carolina 24.9   38.8   25.3   
Ohio 26.6   42.5   25.9   
Oklahoma 27.3   32.7   30.7   
Oregon 24.6   41.6   23.0   
Pennsylvania 25.0   36.5   31.3   
Rhode Island 20.1   30.1   26.0   
South Carolina 25.1   38.8   27.0   
Tennessee 27.0   38.0   36.7   
Texas 23.5   37.8   32.3   
Utah 22.6   34.9   21.6   
Virginia 23.6   34.5   24.7   
Washington 24.0   29.7   29.9   
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TABLE 3 (continued). State-specific Percentage of Adults Categorized as 
Obese by Race, 2006−2008 
State/Area White   
African-
American   Hispanic   
West Virginia 30.2   36.3   26.1   
Wisconsin 24.5   36.4   27.3   
Wyoming 22.5   36.9   28.6   
          Source: CDC, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 58 (27), July 17, 2009. 
 
According to publicly available data from the US Census Bureau (1990), these four 
regions have the highest population density of African-Americans and Hispanics. Figure 1 
illustrates this point. Higher BMI values for African-Americans and Hispanics may be due to 
specific dietary choices. The CDC’s BRFSS survey results also suggest that Asian-Americans 
were the fittest across all states in terms of reported BMI values. 
Obesity rates differ not only across ethnicities and races but also across ages and genders. 
Table 4 shows the prevalence of obesity by age and gender for two periods. The percentage of 
individuals classified as obese has increased for all age groups. Greater percentages of women at 
all age groups were obese than were men. However, in terms of relative change over time the 
obesity prevalence is more pronounced for men. In particular, for men in the age group of 20 to 
34, the percentage change in obesity prevalence between two interval periods is 71%. The 
highest percentage of obese men was in the 65 to 74 age group, whereas the percentage of obese 
among women reaches its peak in the 55 to 64 age group.  
Table 5 further clarifies the differences in BMI for men and women. Both men and 
women show an increase in the prevalence of overweight, obesity, and extreme obesity. 
Although the results from the National Health And Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) 
cycle 1999-2000  show that a greater percentage of women were in the extremely obese 
category, the percentage change from the results reported in NHANES 1988-1994 cycles 
 9 
indicate a greater change for men in the same category.    The prevalence of overweight men 
exhibited the least change. Men seem to be catching up to women in obesity and extreme obesity 
categories but continue to lag behind women in the overweight category.  
 
Table 4. Prevalence of Obesity (BMI > 30) by Age and Gender 
  Men  Women 
Age (Years) 1988 to 1994 1999 to 2000  1988 to 1994 1999 to 2000 
20 to 34 14.1 24.1  18.5 25.8 
35 to 44 21.5 25.2  25.5 33.9 
45 to 54 23.2 30.1  32.4 38.1 
55 to 64 27.2 32.9  33.7 43.1 
65 to 74 24.1 33.4  26.9 38.8 
75 and older 13.2 20.4  19.2 25.1 
Source: CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey. Health, United States (Table 70) 2002.  
 
Table 5. Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity, and Extreme Obesity by Sex 
  Men Women 
 BMI Interval 1988 to 1994 1999 to 2000 1988 to 1994 1999 to 2000 
25 < BMI < 30 61.0 67.0 51.2 62.0 
30 < BMI < 40 20.6 27.7 26.0 34.0 
BMI > 40 1.7 3.1 4.0 6.3 
Source: CDC, National Center for Health Statistics, National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey. Health, United States (Table 70) 2002.  
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Figure 1. Population Density Map by Race 
Source: US Census Bureau
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Individuals with college educations had the lowest prevalence of obesity. The greatest 
prevalence of obesity is observed for individuals with no high school education. In terms of 
cumulative growth rates, for the period from 1991 to 2001 individuals with some college had the 
highest growth rate of obesity prevalence (98%), whereas individuals with no high school had 
the lowest growth rate (66%). Current research on obesity suggests that education is inversely 
related to obesity, but it does not explain why the prevalence of obesity among more educated 
individuals has grown faster than among the less educated. Since education is highly correlated 
with income, the theoretical models in this thesis provide a plausible explanation for this trend. 
Table 6 shows the difference in prevalence of obesity by educational attainment. 
 
Table 6. Prevalence of Obesity by Educational Attainment and Year 
Education Level 1991 1998 2000 2001 
No High School 16.5 24.1 26.1 27.4 
High School 13.3 19.4 21.7 23.2 
Some College 10.6 17.8 19.5 21.0 
College 8.0 13.1 15.2 15.7 
Source: CDC, Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 1991-2001.  
 
 
 
2. BMI 
   The BMI was invented by Adolphe Quetelet, a Belgian mathematician and astronomer. 
In his most well-known work “A Treatise of man and the development of his faculties”, 
published in 1835, he classified individuals using the ratio of height to weight squared that we 
now refer to as BMI (Eknoyan 2008). BMI as a measure of obesity became widely accepted only 
recently. According to Paul Campos (2004, p. 7), the CDC’s warnings that overweight and obese 
people face higher risks of coronary heart disease, congestive heart failure, diabetes, high blood 
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pressure, obstructive sleep apnea and other respiratory problems played an important role in 
adoption of BMI as a measure of obesity. Obesity (from Latin obesus = fat or plump) arises from 
systematic imbalance between energy intake and energy expenditure, which leads to excessive 
accumulation of fat. Since the BMI does not differentiate between the lean mass and fat mass, 
using it as a measure of adiposity raises serious questions. Paul Campos argues that the “obesity 
epidemic” is a myth. He presents the results of several epidemiological studies which suggest 
that individuals that are classified as overweight (BMI > 25) actually had the lowest mortality 
rate (ibid, pp. 11-12). The most powerful evidence that he presents comes from the Seven 
Countries Study, which tracked thousands of men from seven countries for more than forty 
years. The results showed that being overweight posed no risk of mortality, but being thin (BMI 
< 18.5) was associated with greater risk of morbidity than being obese (BMI > 30) (ibid, p. 13).  
 Since BMI ignores the composition of the body’s tissues, it systematically misclassifies 
individuals who are not obese as obese and vice versa. The alternative measures are Total Body 
Fat (TBF), Percent Body Fat (PBF), Waist Circumference (WC), and Waist-to-Hip Ratio 
(WHR). Numerous medical and epidemiological studies show that the alternative measures of 
human adiposity are unambiguously superior to BMI in predicting cardiovascular disease, and 
these should be “…the final nail in the casket for body-mass index as an independent 
cardiovascular risk factor...” (Kragelund and Omland, 2005, pp. 1589-1590). Unfortunately, 
these studies have not been able to stop a new wave of observational studies, especially in the 
social sciences, that use BMI as the only measure of obesity.  
 Cawley and Burkhauser (2006), using the National Health and Nutrition Examination III 
(NHANES III) data, analyze the relationship between BMI and more accurate measures of 
human adiposity. In addition to providing several conversion formulas to obtain superior 
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adiposity measures from BMI, they also estimate the rates of false positive and false negative 
classifications based on BMI. According to their calculations that use Percent Body Fat as the 
‘right’ measure of human adiposity, the BMI classification of obesity has a false positive rate of 
27.74% for women and 44.79% for men. However, a false negative rate is reported to be 5.42% 
for women and 9.31% for men. The BMI misclassification is not limited to gender. Authors 
report that African-American females have 3.56 more kilograms of fat-free mass than white 
females, and African-American males have 1.33 more kilograms of fat-free mass than white 
males. In addition, they suggest that the average percentage of body fat for African-American 
men is 2.85% lower than that of white men. Although the majority of studies of obesity show 
strong racial differences, the authors suggest that the gap may not be as large as many have come 
to believe. In fact, they conclude that based on percentage of body fat, white men have a 16.26% 
higher prevalence of obesity than African-American men and the difference in the prevalence of 
obesity between white and African-American women falls by more than half.  
 BMI nevertheless continues to be the main measure of obesity. The reasons are simple: 
BMI is easy to calculate, widely used around the world, non-invasive to measure, and most 
importantly a very cheap method of assessing adiposity. Although trends in obesity-related 
illnesses do not correspond to trends in the reported prevalence of obesity, a statistically 
significant positive correlation between the BMI and body fat has been the main justification for 
its use in the social sciences.  
 
3. Medical Costs of Obesity 
The scientific community in the medical and social sciences assumes that overweight and 
obese individuals spend more on medical care than individuals with normal weight. Finkelstein 
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et al. (2003) provide evidence that on average medical expenditures for obese individuals is 37 
percent higher than that of normal-weight individuals. Table 7 shows the summary of their main 
findings. Based on the 1998 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), the 1997 National 
Health Interview Surveys (NHIS) and the National Health Accounts (NHA), the authors estimate 
the aggregate medical costs associated with being overweight or obese. The upper limit of the 
estimated cost of obesity alone was $47.5 billion in 1998 dollars and $26.8 billion in 1998 
dollars at the lower limit. The combined costs associated with BMIs in the 30-40 range runs as 
high as $78.5 billion in 1998 dollars. The discrepancy in estimates is driven primarily by the 
inclusion of spending on nursing homes in the NHA data set. About half of these costs were paid 
by Medicare and Medicaid.  
 
Table 7. Aggregate Medical Spending, in Billions of Dollars, 1996-1998 
  Overweight and Obese 
 
Obese 
Insurance Category MEPS (1998) NHA (1998) 
 
MEPS (1998) NHA (1998) 
Out-of-pocket 7.1 12.8  3.8 6.9 
Private 19.8 28.1  9.5 16.1 
Medicaid 3.7 14.1  2.7 10.7 
Medicare 20.9 23.5  10.8 13.8 
Total 51.5 78.5  26.8 47.5 
Source: CDC, Economic Consequences of Obesity. 
Finkelstein, EA, Fiebelkorn, IC, Wang, G. National medical spending attributable to 
overweight and obesity: How much, and who's paying? Health Affairs 2003; W3;219–226. 
 
Finkelstein et al. (2004) combined the 1998 MEPS and the 1997 NHIS data sets with 
information from the CDC’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) covering 
1998 to 2000 to estimate annual state-level medical expenditures associated with obesity. 
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Table 8. Estimated Obesity-Attributable Percentages and Expenditures,  
by State (1998-2000) 
State 
Tot. Pop. 
(%) 
Exp. Tot. 
($MM) 
Medicare 
Pop. (%) 
Exp. 
Medicare 
($MM) 
Medicaid 
Pop. (%) 
Exp. 
Medicaid 
($MM) 
Alabama 6.3 1320 7.7 341 9.9 269 
Alaska 6.7 195 7.7 17 8.2 29 
Arkansas 6.0 663 7.0 171 11.5 180 
California 5.5 7675 6.1 1738 10.0 1713 
Colorado 5.1 874 5.1 139 8.7 158 
Connecticut 4.3 856 6.5 246 11.0 419 
Delaware 5.1 207 9.8 57 13.8 66 
Florida 5.1 3987 6.1 1290 11.6 900 
Georgia 6.0 2133 7.1 405 10.1 385 
Idaho 5.3 227 5.6 40 12.0 69 
Illinois 6.1 3439 7.8 805 12.3 1045 
Indiana 6.0 1637 7.2 379 15.7 522 
Iowa 6.0 783 7.5 165 9.4 198 
Kentucky 6.2 1163 7.5 270 11.4 340 
Louisiana 6.4 1373 7.4 402 12.9 525 
Maine 5.6 357 5.7 66 10.7 137 
Maryland 6.0 1533 7.7 368 12.9 391 
Massachusetts 4.7 1822 5.6 446 7.8 618 
Michigan 6.5 2931 7.8 748 13.2 882 
Minnesota 5.0 1307 6.6 227 8.6 325 
Mississippi 6.5 757 8.1 223 11.6 221 
Missouri 6.1 1636 7.1 413 11.9 454 
Montana 4.9 175 6.2 41 9.8 48 
Nebraska 5.8 454 7.0 94 10.3 114 
New Jersey 5.5 2342 7.1 591 9.8 630 
New Mexico 4.8 324 4.6 51 8.5 84 
New York 5.5 6080 6.7 1391 9.5 3539 
N.Carolina 6.0 2138 7.0 448 11.5 662 
North Dakota 6.1 209 7.7 45 11.7 55 
Oklahoma 6.0 854 7.0 227 9.9 163 
Ohio 6.1 3304 7.7 839 10.3 914 
Oregon 5.7 781 6.0 145 8.8 180 
Pennsylvania 6.2 4138 7.4 1187 11.6 1219 
Rhode Island 5.2 305 6.5 83 7.7 89 
S.Carolina 6.2 1060 7.7 242 10.6 285 
South Dakota 5.3 195 5.9 36 9.9 45 
Tennessee 6.4 1840 7.6 433 10.5 488 
Texas 6.1 5340 6.8 1209 11.8 1177 
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Table 8 (continued). Estimated Obesity-Attributable Percentages and Expenditures, 
by State (1998-2000) 
State 
Tot. Pop. 
(%) 
Exp. Tot. 
($MM) 
Medicare 
Pop. (%) 
Exp. 
Medicare 
($MM) 
Medicaid 
Pop. (%) 
Exp. 
Medicaid 
($MM) 
Utah 5.2 393 5.8 62 9.0 71 
Vermont 5.3 141 6.9 29 8.6 40 
Virginia 5.7 1641 6.7 320 13.1 374 
Washington 5.4 1330 6.0 236 9.9 365 
West Virginia 6.4 588 7.3 140 11.4 187 
Wisconsin 5.8 1486 7.7 306 9.1 320 
Wyoming 4.9 87 5.9 15 8.5 23 
Total 5.7 75051 6.8 17701 10.6 21329 
Source: CDC. Finkelstein, EA, Fiebelkorn, IC, Wang, G. State-level estimates of annual  
medical expenditures attributable to obesity. Obesity Research 2004;12(1):18–24. 
 
 
Table 8 shows the estimated state-level percentages and nominal values out of total health 
expenditures, Medicare, and Medicaid expenditures. The lowest state-level medical expenditures 
associated with obesity are observed in Wyoming ($87 million) and the highest expenditures in 
California ($7.7 billion). The reported estimates are not adjusted for population sizes. These 
estimates are based only on direct medical costs and do not account for the indirect costs 
associated with productivity loss.  
 
4. Obesity in the Economics Literature 
Economic research on healthy behavior, in fact, predates the recent obesity epidemic. 
Grossman (1972) developed a dynamic model of the demand for health as a stock variable. He 
argues that an individual determines his or her optimal stock of health by equating the marginal 
product of this capital good to the marginal cost measured as the price of gross investment in 
health. Grossman's major contribution is combining theory with empirical work. He ensured that 
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economically relevant variables, such as education and age, were no longer impounded in the 
utility function but in behavioral constraints, thus allowing for clear predictions about their 
effects on health.  
Recent economic research has been more specific. Ruhm (2003) finds that the number of 
extremely obese people decreases during economic downturns. He uses micro-data from the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System for adults from 1987 to 2000, and shows that a one 
percentage point increase in unemployment reduces the estimated prevalence of severe obesity 
by 1.4 percentage points. Ruhm attributes this reduction to individual decisions to use additional 
non-market time to exercise and to consume more healthy foods.  
Rashad and Grossman (2004) argue that as much as two-thirds of the increase in obesity 
since 1980 can be explained by growth in the number of per capita fast-food restaurants and 
higher cigarette taxes. Although media and public interest organizations blame fast-food 
restaurants for super-sized meals, Jeitschko and Pecchenino (2006) argue that super-size meals 
are socially desirable. The authors offer an elegant theoretical model with unexpected results: 
when tastes are randomly distributed over the entire population and the costs of meal 
preparations are exogenous, the socially optimal size of meals is larger than the average home-
cooked meal size. 
Lakdwalla and Philipson (2002) suggest that a reduction in the real prices of grocery food 
items as a potential explanatory factor in the growing number of obese people. Their estimate of 
the real price effect explains almost 40% of the increase in obesity since 1980. 
Cutler, Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) offer a novel explanation for the growth of obesity: 
they argue that technological innovations in food-preparation technologies, such as vacuum 
packing, improved preservatives, deep freezing, artificial flavors, and the microwave oven 
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increased the quantity and variety of foods consumed. They argue that technological innovations 
in food manufacturing, processing, and storing have contributed to increasing prevalence of 
obesity in the US.  
Huston and Finke (2003) present a model where an individual's discount rate determines 
diet quality. Their model predicts that individuals with higher discount rates will choose lower 
quality diets. By employing a dataset from the Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals 
(CSFII) and the Diet and Health Knowledge Survey (DHKS) for the years 1994-96, they show 
that being a smoker, an indicator variable that serves as a proxy for higher personal discount 
rates, results in a lower Healthy Eating Index. 
In addition to these studies, there are some intriguing explanations of obesity by scholars 
in other fields. For example, Greg Critser (2003) makes an almost convincing case that high-
fructose syrup and governmental policies starting with the Nixon administration were the culprits 
to the recent physical expansion of the average American Joe and Jane. Bray et al. (2004) 
provide a more formal analysis of how high-fructose corn syrup in beverages may have 
contributed to the unprecedented growth of obesity in the US. Between 1970 and 1990, the use 
of high-fructose corn syrup increased ten-fold. But scientists disagree with this claim; high-
fructose corn-syrup, which replaced cane and beet sugar in the 1980s, is made of 55% fructose 
and 45% glucose and it is not very different than regular white sugar, which consists of 50% 
fructose and 50% glucose (Warner 2006). Scientists who study human endocrinology and 
nutrition claim that a small increase in fructose is not sufficient to cause the large change in the 
prevalence of obesity that has been observed since 1980. Although the trends for prevalence of 
obesity and the consumption of high-fructose syrup in the United States are positively correlated, 
the connection is spurious. 
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Keith et al. (2006) offer by far the most comprehensive statistical analysis of factors that 
contribute to obesity. They specifically investigate the effects of ten factors: sleep deprivation; 
endocrine disruptors; changes in ambient temperature; decreased smoking; new medical drugs; 
ethnicity; the decision to have children at a later age; obesity-predisposing genotypes; and 
assortative mating. Although the findings were not generated by controlled experiments, their 
study is equally compelling as the studies based on ecological correlations. The following 
reviews some of these factors in greater detail. 
Sleep deprivation is associated with endocrine changes, which lead to increased hunger 
pangs and appetite. During the past several decades, average daily sleep among adults has 
decreased from over nine hours to seven hours (ibid., p. 1587). 
Endocrine disruptors, chemicals that have widespread industrial and household use, are 
associated with increased BMI (Pelletier et al. 2003). Exposure to these chemicals may 
potentially have adverse effects on children. For example, Noren et al. (2000) report that the 
concentration of polybrominated diphenyl ether, a potent endocrine disruptor, doubled every five 
years since 1972 in Swedish women's breast milk.   
Changes in ambient indoor temperatures as a result of the diffusion of air-conditioners in 
western countries may have contributed to the growth of obesity. The thermo neutral zone is the 
range in temperature in which human body reduces its energy expenditure. Any deviation from 
this range of temperature leads to increased energy expenditure. Ability to control in-house 
temperature during winter and summer times to the comfortable range has disturbed our natural 
mechanism for burning calories. 
Epidemiologic studies show that smokers are less likely to be overweight and that they 
gain weight rapidly upon quitting smoking. Rates of smoking in the US have been steadily 
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declining in the recent decades, which in turn may have contributed to the prevalence of obesity 
today.  
Antidepressants, anti-diabetics, contraceptives, and antihistamines, among other 
prescription drugs, have been shown to induce weight gain. In support of this hypothesis the 
authors mention a study that reports how use of contraceptives regularly by women led to 
estimated mean weight gain of approximately five kilograms in two years. One particular study 
cited by the authors finds that the odds of obesity increased 14.4% for every five-year increment 
in maternal age. Although delaying birth may lead to higher lifetime earnings in the job market, 
it looks as if it does not come without costs. 
An unusual factor that some scholars have investigated is the observed positive 
association between greater BMI and greater reproductive fitness. The authors argue that 
individuals genetically predisposed toward higher BMIs reproduce at greater rates. The evidence 
they propose is based on the observation that the number of offspring is positively correlated 
with higher BMIs among women and that higher BMIs among parents before having a child is 
correlated with larger number of offspring. 
 
5. Studies of Obesity in Nutrition Science 
The energy balance refers to the application of the first law of thermodynamics to a 
human body. Energy intake (food) must equal energy expenditure (heat and work) plus energy 
stored (fat and carbohydrate reserves). Energy intake and expenditure tend to be surprisingly 
stable in the long term. A short-term imbalance is expected, since the timing of the energy intake 
varies and the expenditure tends to be relatively stable. Compounds such as glycogen and 
triacylglycerol are stored in adipose tissue, and they serve as energy reserves during the periods 
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of energy imbalance (Frayn 2003, pp. 214-215). Glycogen cannot be used to correct the energy 
imbalance over the long period. In the absence of additional energy intake, the glycogen reserves 
will be depleted in 18 hours and the tryiacylglycerol reserves in 55 days to maintain the average 
energy expenditure requirements for a person who weighs 65 kilograms (ibid., p. 216). 
Triacylglycerol deposits in adipose tissue, commonly referred to as fat, act as the long 
term solution to energy imbalance. As energy intake consistently exceeds energy expenditure, 
the amout of triacylglycerol increases accordingly. The disruptions in metabolic processes may 
reduce energy expenditure, further exacerbating the accumulation of triacylglycerol in adipose 
tissue (ibid., pp. 315-316). 
The long term regulation of appetite occurs through the interaction of peptide excretion in 
adipose tissue and the hypothalamus. Leptin, a peptide excreted by adipose tissue, signals the 
size of fat reserves to the hypothalamus and insulin signals the state of carbohydrate reserves 
(ibid., pp. 302-303). The immediate satiety information comes from the intestinal tract, the 
hepatic portal vein, and the liver. These are basic biological mechanisms that regulate the energy 
intake. 
On the energy expenditure side, the largest contribution comes from the basal metabolic 
rate, the energy required to keep the human body at rest alive. The basal metabolic rate depends 
on total lean body mass. A greater total lean mass leads to higher basal metabolic rate (ibid., pp. 
207-313). Since adipose tissue is comprised of fat and lean mass, excessive energy intake also 
leads to more energy expenditure. A proportionate match between the energy intake and 
expenditure across different weights implies that there are many equilibrium body mass states. 
The only explanations that accounts for the observed dramatic changes in Body Mass 
Index in the US and other countries is a continuous excessive growth rate of energy intake 
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relative to energy expenditure, or defective genes that lead to hormonal imbalance. Although the 
genetic factors explain almost half of the variation in the growth of obesity, a substantial portion 
of variation in the growth of obesity is due to environmental factors. 
Recent studies in nutrition consistently point to the increased consumption of energy 
dense foods as the primary environmental reason for the growth of obesity (Rosengren and 
Lissner 2008, pp. 260-270). Drewnowski and Darmon (2005) investigate the dietary choices of 
837 French adults and find statistically and economically significant evidence of an inverse 
relationship between energy density and dietary cost. The authors conclude that the apparent cost 
disparity is the leading cause for the disproportionately greater number of obese people at the 
lower end of the income distribution. Although Americans spend a smaller share of their income 
on food today than ever, according to Sturm (2009) most of the reduction came from food at 
home; meanwhile the share of income spent on food away from home increased slightly.  
According to Howarth et al. (2006), the observed differences in BMI across ethnic groups 
are partially explained by the consumption of energy-dense foods. In particular, they conclude 
that the energy density of foods may be a better predictor of BMI than the total energy intake. In 
another study conducted by Mendoza et al. (2006), the authors find that the energy density of 
foods has a statistically significant positive association with BMI in children. 
In a study of optimal weight management, Ello-Martin et al. (2005) find that the energy 
density of food is a more important factor in reducing energy intake than is the volume of food. 
They conclude that reducing energy density without reducing volume is a better strategy for 
weight management than the traditional volume dependent strategies. 
Rolls et al. (2006), in a series of experimental studies, found that reducing the portion 
size by 25% leads to 10% reduction in the energy intake, whereas reducing the energy density of 
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meals by 25% leads to 24% reduction in energy intake. They also find that portion sizes and 
energy density have statistically independent effects on energy intake. The key finding in both 
studies is that energy density has more pronounced effect on energy intake than the volume of 
food consumed. 
 
6. Summary 
 This chapter presented basic facts about the prevalence of obesity across the United 
States and trends in obesity rates over time, addressed the measurement problems associated with 
BMI, and summarized the essential findings in the economics and nutrition science literatures on 
obesity. The economics literature on obesity primarily focuses on the volume of food consumed 
as the key factor contributing to obesity. The lower overall cost of food items, proliferation of 
fast-food restaurants, technological innovations in the food industry, and higher cigarette taxes 
have been shown to be statistically associated with an increase total food consumption. The 
nutrition science literature suggests that excessive weight gain is not a simple function of the 
volume of food consumed. Carefully designed experimental studies show that weight gain is 
primarily driven by increased consumption of high-energy density foods relative to low-energy 
density foods. In simple terms, a person can actually lose weight by consuming a greater volume 
of food, as long as the relative share of high density foods decreases. The existing economics 
literature, especially in the area of theoretical modeling of rational weight accumulation, does not 
make a clear distinction between the types of foods consumed. This thesis contributes to the 
economics literature on obesity by presenting two rational choice models that take into account 
the importance of energy dense foods.  
 Ruhm’s interpretation of how a higher state-level unemployment rate leads to a lower 
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prevalence of extreme obesity is based on the assumption that unemployed individuals will 
engage in more physical activities and improve the quality of their diets. The study finds no 
statistically significant effect of unemployment on those who are overweight and obese, but the 
sign on the coefficient for overweight is positive. Ruhm’s results indirectly suggest that lowering 
income leads to improvements in health for those who are classified as extremely obese, but it 
also suggests that the effect maybe positive for those who are classified as overweight. The 
models in the following chapter will shed light as to why changes in income can have differing 
impacts across BMI intervals.  
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CHAPTER III 
READY-MADE MEALS 
 
1.  Introduction 
 This chapter introduces the first theoretical model of how individuals gain excess weight. 
It is a simple static model of consumer choice where a person faces a standard labor-leisure 
tradeoﬀ. There are, however, several distinct diﬀerences between the textbook model and the 
model proposed here. In addition to consumption goods sold in the marketplace, the person has 
to purchase health services, which I assume to be increasing in weight. More weight, therefore, 
requires more money to be spent on healthcare. The eﬀect of more weight is not limited to 
health; it is better to think of it as a factor influencing transaction costs in social settings. The 
textile industry makes products with the average built person in mind, seats in all modes of 
transportation are designed with a similar mindset, and even the last transportation mode that 
most people use (a coffin) is made for the average sized person. Although the real world 
transaction costs arising from weight are likely to be more complex, the assumption of constant 
cost per unit of weight simplifies the analysis. Weight is assumed to be a by-product of 
consuming more energy dense foods and engaging in sedentary life styles. The primary goal of 
the model is to shed light on the eﬀect of an income tax on the person’s optimal weight. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 introduces the model. 
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Section 2 presents the results of the comparative static analysis of the optimal weight with 
respect to the marginal income tax rate. Section 3 discusses the testable implications. Section 4 
addresses the model’s limitations. Section 5 summarizes the chapter. 
 
2. A Theoretical Model of Ready-Made Meals 
 The person derives pleasure from leisure activities, L, and the composite commodity, M, 
purchased in the marketplace: U=U(M,L) , where M=c1 +c2, c1 is a high-energy density food, c2 
is a low-energy density food, and L is time spent in leisure activities, which I normalized to be 
between 0 and 1. The utility function is strictly concave in both M and L such that 0U
M
∂
>
∂
, 
0U
L
∂
>
∂
, 
2
2 0
U
M
∂
<
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2
2 0
U
L
∂
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. The person's ability to purchase goods 
is limited by wage income w(1-L), non-wage income A, the prices of commodities p1 and p2, and 
the costs arising from additional weight p3F. Weight is a byproduct of the relative share of the 
high-energy density food in the composite good and a sedentary life style: F Lβθ δ= + . 
Furthermore, I assume that there are biological limits to weight accumulation and loss. For 
simplicity, I assume that all leisure activities lead to a sedentary life style. Since the model 
focuses on the relative amounts of high and low-energy density foods, it is more convenient to 
express them in terms of their relative share:
 
1
1 2
c
c c
θ =
+
. The person's choice of how much of 
the composite commodity to purchase, its composition, how much time to allocate to leisure 
activities, and subsequently the optimal weight can be summarized as follows: 
, ,
max
M L θ
   
( , )U U M L=
         (1), 
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1 2 3(1 ) (1 )w L A p M p M p Fθ θ− + = + − +       (2). 
The utility function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:
 
1
,  where 0 <  < 1.U M Lα α α−=
 
The 
Lagrangian for the problem takes the following form:
 
1-
1 2 3( (1- ) - - (1- ) - )M L w L A p M p M p Fα α λ θ θ= + +L     (3). 
The first-order necessary conditions to this problem are: 
1 1
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α αα λ θ θ− −
∂
= − + − =
∂
L
     (4), 
  
 30 :  (1- ) ( ) 0M L w pL
α αα λ δ−
∂
= − + =
∂
L
       (5), 
 
 2 1 30 :  (( ) ) 0p p M pλ βθ
∂
= − − =
∂
L
        (6), 
 
1 2 30 :  (1 ) (1 ) 0w L A p M p M p Fθ θλ
∂
= − + − − − − =
∂
L
    (7). 
 
Equation (4) states that the marginal utility from one more unit of the composite commodity has 
to be balanced against the weighted average price of commodities, where the weighting factor is 
the share of c1 in M. Equation (5) states that the marginal utility from one more unit of time spent 
in leisure activities has to be balanced against the full cost of leisure, the foregone wage in the 
labor market and the additional expenditure arising from more weight. Equation (6) determines 
the optimal amount of the composite commodity. Since θ  is restricted to be between 0 and 1, the 
solution has to satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimization with inequality constraints. 
In particular, the solution will consist of three separate cases: (i) 0q = , a completely healthy 
composite commodity; (ii) 1q = , a completely unhealthy composite commodity; (iii) 
0 1q< < , a mixed composite commodity. 
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2.1 High Income 
 If individuals have sufficiently high income, then they will purchase only low-energy 
density foods and the composite commodity consists only of c2.  
 
Proposition 1 If p2 > p1 and 2 3
2 1( )
p pA w
p p
β
α
+ >
−
, then the optimal demand for the composite 
commodity, and optimal time for leisure activities are: 
*
2
( )w AM
p
α +
=
         (8), 
*
3
(1 )( )w AL
w p
α
δ
− +
=
+
 
        (9). 
Proof: see Appendix A.  
 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. Since the restriction 0q =  implies that 
the composite commodity consists only of c2, the optimal quantity of the composite commodity 
will depend only on the price of the low-energy density food and total income. Similarly, the 
optimal time for leisure activities depends on total income divided by the full price of leisure 
activities, which consists of the foregone wage and the healthcare costs associated with gaining 
weight. The derived demand for the optimal weight, therefore, is given by: 
* *
3
(1 )( )w AF L
w p
α
δ δ
δ
 − +
= =  + 
       (10). 
Since the optimal weight, in this case, depends only on L, any changes in the wage rate, non-
wage income, and the healthcare cost per unit of weight will have effects on the optimal weight 
similar to the optimal level of time devoted to leisure. With Cobb-Douglas preferences, the effect 
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of a change in the wage rate on the optimal weight is shown below: 
*
3
2
3
(1 )( )
( )
p AF
w w p
δ α δ
δ
− −∂
=
∂ +
        (11). 
As the non-wage income has to be greater than the healthcare cost per unit of weight by the 
restriction 0q = , i.e., 3p Ad < , the optimal weight must decrease when the wage rate 
increases. The second derivative of the optimal weight with respect to the wage rate is given by:  
2
3
2 3
3
2 (1 )( ) 0( )
p AF
w w p
δ α δ
δ
− − −∂
= >
∂ +
       (12). 
The sign of the second derivative is positive when 3p Ad < , which implies that the weight of the 
person with high income approaches the lower biological limit asymptotically as the wage rate 
increases. 
 
2.2 Low Income 
 If individuals have sufficiently low income, then they will purchase only high-energy 
density foods and the composite commodity consists only of c1.  
 
Proposition 2 If p2 > p1 and 3 2
2 1
(1 )p pA w
p p
β
α
α
 
+ < − − − 
, then the optimal demand for the 
composite commodity, and the optimal time for leisure activities are: 
* 3
2
( )w A pM
p
α β+ −
=
        (13), 
* 3
3
(1 )( )w A pL
w p
α β
δ
− + −
=
+         (14). 
Proof: see Appendix A.  
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Proposition 2 suggests that the optimal quantity of the composite commodity will depend only on 
the price of the high-energy density food and total income adjusted for healthcare costs. In 
contrast to the high income scenario, the optimal time for leisure activities in this case is adjusted 
for the costly side effect of consuming high-energy density goods. The derived demand for the 
optimal weight, therefore, is given by: 
* 3
3
(1 )( )w A pF
w p
α β
β δ
δ
 − + −
= +  + 
       (15). 
The derivative of the optimal demand for weight with respect to the wage rate is 
*
3 3
2
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      (16). 
The sign of this derivative depends on the size of A. As the restriction on the relative share of c1 
requires A to be less than the health-related expenditure per unit of weight, i.e., 3 3 ,p p Ad b+ >
increasing the wage rate results in greater weight gain. The second derivative of the optimal 
weight is given by: 
2 *
3 3
2 3
3
2 (1 )( ) 0( )
p p AF
w w p
δ α δ β
δ
− − + −∂
= <
∂ +
      (17). 
The sign of this derivative is negative, which implies that weight is increasing at a decreasing 
rate as the wage rate increases.  
 
2.3 Intermediate Income 
 If individuals have average income, then they will purchase a combination of high and 
low-energy density foods and the composite commodity consists of both c1 and c2.  
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Proposition 3 If p2 > p1 and 3 2 32
2 1 2 1
(1 ) ( )
p p pp A w
p p p p
β β
α
α α
 
− − ≤ + ≤ − − 
, then the optimal 
demand for the composite commodity, the optimal time for leisure activities, and the optimal 
composition of the commodity bundle are: 
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Proof: see Appendix A.  
 
Proposition 3 suggests that the optimal quantity of the composite commodity depends on the 
relative prices of high- and low-energy density foods and health related expenditures. Similarly, 
the optimal time spent in leisure activities is determined by the interaction of those relative prices 
and income. The optimal share of a high-energy density food increases with an increase in 
income, the prices of low-energy density foods and health related expenditures.  
The derived demand for the optimal weight is given by: * * *F Lβθ δ= + . Since the 
optimal weight depends on both *L  and
 
*θ , increasing the wage rate will have a different effect 
on the optimal weight in comparison to the boundary cases: 
[ ]* 1 2 3 1 2 3 2
2
3 1 2 3
( )( ) ( )( )
(1 ) ( )( )
p p w p p p A w p pF
w p p p w p
δ δ δ βα
α δ
− + − − + +∂ −
= +
∂ − − +
  (21). 
The restrictions in Proposition 3 imply that the sign of this derivative is negative. In this case, the 
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person chooses less leisure, because the substitution effect from an increase in the wage rate is 
greater than the income effect. In addition to the substitution effect between work and leisure, 
this person will increase the relative share of a low-energy density food.  
 
3. The Effect of Tax 
A marginal tax, τ, on earned income affects the person’s budget constraint. The 
optimization problem can be restated as follows: 
, ,
max
M L θ
 
( , )U U M L=
         (22), 
 
1 2 3(1 )(1 ) (1 )w L A p M p M p Fτ θ θ− − + = + − +      (23). 
The first-order conditions from differentiating the new Lagrangian are: 
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The effect of a marginal income tax on the optimal weight depends on the relative share of the 
high-energy density food in the composite commodity.  
 
Proposition 4 If p2 > p1 and 3 2
2 1
[ (1 )]p pp pA w
β
α α−+ < − − , then a higher tax increases weight: 
3
2
3
(1 )( )
[ (1 ) ] 0
w A pF
w p
δ α δ
τ τ δ
∗ − −∂
∂ − +
= >
 
       (28). 
Proof: see Appendix A.  
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Since non-wage income is greater than health expenditure per unit of weight, a higher tax rate 
will increase the optimal weight for individuals with high incomes. In the high income case, the 
only channel by which the optimal weight can change is through changes in the time available 
between labor hours and leisure hours; it suggests that in this person’s labor-leisure choice the 
substitution effect dominates the income effect.  
 
Proposition 5 If p2 > p1 and 3 2
2 1
[ (1 )]p pp pA w
β
α α−+ < − − , then a higher tax increases weight: 
3
2
3
(1 ) [ (1 ) ]
[ (1 ) ] 0
w w A pF
w p
δ α τ β
τ τ δ
∗ − − + +∂
∂ − +
= >
       (29). 
Proof: see Appendix A.  
 
A higher tax unambiguously will increase the optimal weight for individuals with low income. 
The result, similar to the high income case, is driven by substitution toward more leisure.  
 
Proposition 6 If p2 > p1 and 2 3
2 1
(1 ) p pp pA w
βτ −+ − < , then a higher tax decreases weight: 
2 1 2 1 2 3
2
3 1 2
( ) [( )( (1 ) ) ]
[( (1 ) )( )] 0
p p w p p w A p pF
w p p p
δ τ β
τ τ δ
∗ − − − + −∂
∂ − + −
= <
      (30). 
Proof: see Appendix A.  
 
 If the composite commodity consists of both goods, which occurs if the person’s income 
is neither low nor high, the derivative of the optimal weight with respect to the tax variable is 
negative. Proposition 6 suggests that, a higher tax has two channels of influence on the optimal 
weight in the intermediate income case. The first is through its effect on the choice of leisure. 
With the restrictions imposed on income, the substitution effect in the labor-leisure tradeoff is 
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smaller than the income effect, which implies that a higher tax leads to less time spent in leisure 
activities. The second channel of influence is the effect of a higher tax on the relative amount of 
the high-energy density food in the composite commodity. A higher tax will increase the relative 
mix of the high-energy density food, which increases the optimal weight. The net effect of a 
higher tax, according to the Proposition 6, is a reduction in the optimal weight, as the weight loss 
from less leisure is greater than the weight gain from consuming a relatively greater quantity of 
the high-energy density good. 
 
4. Testable Implications 
 Although the model presented in the previous sections of this chapter is simple, it 
generates several testable implications. First, the optimal weight is higher for individuals with 
low incomes compared to those with high incomes. An increase in the wage rate leads to a 
greater weight gain for low income individuals; meanwhile, for high income individuals, it leads 
to weight loss. Second, a higher marginal income tax rate leads to an increase in the optimal 
weight for low and high income individuals, and it leads to a reduction in the optimal weight for 
average income individuals. The model implies that the individual's rational choice of optimal 
weight depends on income in a non-linear fashion. Individuals with low income rationally 
accumulate weight as their wages increase, whereas those with intermediate and high incomes 
reduce their optimal weight. 
Individuals with lower incomes can afford only the unhealthy good; therefore, a higher 
wage rate will increase their optimal weight. Although individuals with higher incomes will 
consume only the healthy commodity, the key factor is how raising the wage rate affects the time 
allocated to leisure activities. With Cobb-Douglas preferences, it is clear that a rising wage will 
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lead to less weight. The choice of weight at intermediate income levels, however, is not as clear 
as in high and low income polar cases. A rising wage rate generates two opposing effects on the 
optimal weight: (a) substitution toward the healthy good and (b) increase in leisure activities. But 
within the specified income range, the weight gain from more leisure is more than offset by the 
weight loss from reducing consumption of the unhealthy good. An example of this would be the 
case when one starts to buy more vegetables and fewer hot dogs as income rises. 
Another implication of the model is that the distribution of income may reveal 
information about the average weight. States with greater income inequality and larger 
proportions of people in the low income group should have a higher average weight than states 
with greater income equality or a large proportion of individuals living prosperously. 
 
5. Limitations 
 The theoretical implications discussed in the previous section depend on two fundamental 
assumptions and one implicit assumption. The first assumption has to do with price differences 
between high and low-energy density foods. The second assumption involves the restriction that 
all leisure activities are sedentary. The third assumption is related to the dietary choices of 
individuals conditional on their socio-economic status. In this section, I address these limitations 
and provide justification as to why these assumptions have some empirical support. 
 The costs of low-energy density foods have been reported to be higher than that of high-
energy density foods (Drewnowski and Darmon 2005). Monsivais and Drewnowski (2007) 
investigate the prices of 372 foods and beverages in 2004 and 2006 in the Seattle, WA, 
metropolitan area. They report a strong and substantial inverse association between energy 
density and prices. Energy dense grains, fats, and sweets were associated with lower out-of-
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pocket costs, measured in terms of dollars per 1,000 kilo-calories, whereas lean meats, low-fat 
dairy products, vegetables, and fruits were more costly. For example, the prices of foods in the 
highest quintile of energy density averaged $1.76/1,000 kilo-calories and the prices of foods in 
the lowest quintile averaged $18.16/1,000 kilo-calories. In addition to the reported price 
differential, the authors also indicate that the prices of high-energy density foods have declined, 
whereas the prices of low-energy density foods have risen over the sample period, which further 
contributes to the widening of the cost disparity.  
 Monsivais and Drewnowski (2009) report that the energy-adjusted diet cost increased 
monotonically with income and energy density decreased monotonically with income. A similar 
pattern was observed when income was replaced by an education variable. The importance of 
this work is two-fold. First, in contrast to other studies, the authors investigate the association 
between diet quality and socio-economic status by controlling for energy-adjusted diet costs. 
Second, the results of this research suggest that the choice of diet quality depends on socio-
economic status, which stands in contrast to the existing and commonly accepted implicit 
assumption in nutritional studies that the problem of diet quality arises from ignorance about the 
nutritional contents of food. 
 Not all leisure activities involve sitting in front of a TV set and eating junk food. Some 
individuals engage in rather physically demanding leisure activities such as hiking, biking, and 
long walks on the beach. The model, however, lumps all leisure activities into one type and 
assumes that they contribute to weight gain. This simplifying assumption is made for two 
reasons. First, explicitly introducing many types of leisure would complicate the model and add 
very little to the results. Second, even if many types of leisure were introduced, the net impact of 
leisure on weight would still depend on relative shares of each type of activity in total leisure 
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time, weighted by their BMI-increasing or decreasing effects per unit of time. It is very difficult 
to ascertain the net impact of all leisure activities on weight, but if the net impact on weight is 
positive, then the assumption is valid. Nonetheless, by looking at time-use surveys, we can make 
some educated guesses about the relative importance of physically demanding and sedentary 
leisure activities. Aguiar and Hurst (2006) analyze such data from 1965 to 2003. They document 
a dramatic increase in leisure time and the magnitude of increase is disproportionately greater for 
individuals in lower socio-economic statusus. Brownson et al. (2005) describe current patterns 
and long-term trends by separating leisure activities into physically intensive and sedentary 
types. Trends in physically intensive leisure activities from 1990 to 2000 indicate a relative 
decline for less educated and a relative increase for individuals with college educations. Trends 
in sedentary leisure activities from 1950 to 2000 indicate a sharp rise. For example, the authors 
report that the average US household increased its TV watching by 36 minutes every ten years. 
According to the US time-use survey for 2009, watching TV accounted for the most time in 
leisure activities. The empirical observations indicate that larger shares of total leisure time are 
being allocated to sedentary activities. These patterns, however, are not sufficient to claim that 
the net impact of all leisure activities on weight is positive, but they support the plausibility of 
that assumption.  
 
6. Summary 
 This chapter introduced the first model of how individuals rationally accumulate weight. 
The model is based on one-period decision making where weight enters as a byproduct of 
consuming high-energy density foods and engaging in sedentary life styles. The results of a 
comparative static analysis show that a higher marginal tax on income leads to an increase in 
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weight for high and low income individuals, but that it leads to a decrease in weight for average 
income individuals.  
 The model has several limitations and Section 4 addresses some of these issues. One key 
deficiency of the model is that it ignores the possibility of home-production. The next chapter 
introduces a model where individuals can also produce food at home.  
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CHAPTER IV 
HOME-MADE MEALS 
  
1. Introduction 
  Although the model in the previous chapter explains why rational individuals choose to 
gain weight and generates several testable implications, it is built on the assumptions that 
individuals do not prepare meals at home, which limits the usefulness of the model. The 
following model explicitly accounts for production at home in the spirit of the Becker-Gronau 
theory of household production. The key assumption in this model is that the utility-generating 
home-made meal uses healthier market inputs, which are different from the inputs used by firms 
to make ready-made meals. For example, soups and other home-made dishes require mineral 
rich, low-energy density inputs. Furthermore, healthy foods are assumed to help to maintain a 
healthy weight, represented by a negative sign in front of the healthy input in the weight 
equation. Apart from these differences, the structure of the model is similar to the model 
presented in the previous chapter. 
 The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents 
the results of a comparative static analysis. Section 4 discusses the testable implications. Section 
5 summarizes the chapter. 
 
2. The Model  
A person derives pleasure from leisure activities l, the ready-made meal that is conducive
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to weight gain c1, the home-made meal H that requires a low-energy density input c2, sold in the 
marketplace, and the time used in home production t: 12 ,  where 0 <  < 1.H c tα α α−=  Formally, 
the utility function is assumed to be, as in the previous model, linearly homogeneous:  
 
1 1 1 2 1 2( , , ) ln( ) ln( ) (1 )ln( )U c l H a c a l a a H= + + − −  
 As a result, the utility function is strictly and jointly concave in all terms. The person's ability to 
purchase commodities is limited by wage income (1 )w l t- - , non-wage income
 
A , the prices 
of commodities p1 and p2, and expenditures on healthcare arising from weight p3F. Weight is a 
byproduct of consuming ready-made meals c1 in excess of healthy input intake c2 and leisure:
 
β β β= − +1 1 2 2 3F c c l . The time not used to supply labor and to prepare meals at home leads to 
weight loss. The rational person's problem then becomes: 
1 2, , ,
max
c l c t
 
1
1 1 2 1 2 2ln( ) ln( ) (1 )ln( )a c a l a a c tα α−+ + − −     (31), 
1 1 2 2 3(1 )w l t A p c p c p F− − + = + +       (32). 
Combining (31) and (32), I form the Lagrangian 
1 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 3( , , , ) ( (1 ) [ ])U c l c t w l t A p c p c p c c lλ β β β= + − − + − − − − +L   (33). 
The first-order necessary conditions are given below: 
1
0
c
∂
∂ =
L
: 1
1 1 1 3
( ) 0a
c
p pλ β− + =
       (34), 
 
 
2
0
c
∂
∂ =
L
: 1 2
2
(1 )
2 2 3( ) 0a ac p p
α λ β− − − − =
      (35), 
 
 0l
∂
∂ =
L : 2 3 3( ) 0al w pλ β− + =        (36), 
 
 0t
∂
∂ =
L : 1 2
(1 )(1 ) 0a at w
α λ− − − − =
       (37), 
 
 0λ
∂
∂ =
L : 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 3(1 ) ( ) 0w l t A p c p c p c c lβ β β− − + − − − − + =               (38). 
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Equation (34) shows that the rational individual must weigh the marginal utility from consuming 
ready-made meals against the full cost: the sum of the unhealthy commodity's price and the cost 
of healthcare per unit of weight arising from additional units of ready-made meals. Equation (35) 
shows that the marginal utility from consuming the healthy input must be balanced against the 
full cost: the difference between its price and the reduction in health expenditures per unit of 
weight from consuming more of the healthy input. Equation (36) shows that the marginal utility 
of leisure must be balanced against the full cost: the sum of the foregone wage and the cost of the 
health expenditure per unit of weight arising from additional time spent in sedentary activities. 
Equation (37) shows that the marginal utility from an increase in the quantity of home-cooked 
meals resulting from spending more time preparing them must be balanced against the 
opportunity cost of time in the outside work, i.e., foregone wages. 
Proposition 7 Equations (31) and (32) together with the first order conditions (33)-(38) imply 
that the optimal demand for high-energy dense foods, low-energy dense foods, time spent in 
home production, and optimal time for leisure activities are: 
1
1 1 3
( )
1
a w A
p pc β
+∗
+=           (39), 
 
1 2
2 2 3
(1 )( )
2
a a w A
p pc
α
β
− − +∗
−=          (40), 
 
1 2(1 )(1 )( )a a w A
w
t α− − − +∗ =
                    (41), 
 
2
3 3
( )a w A
w pl β
+∗
+=           (42). 
Proof: see Appendix A.  
Proposition 7 suggests that the optimal demand for high and low-energy foods is determined by 
total income and the opportunity cost of consumption, measured directly in terms of prices and 
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indirectly in terms of the effects on weight. The optimal time for home production depends on 
total income and the opportunity cost of engaging in home production, measured in terms of the 
market wage rate. Similarly, the optimal time for leisure activities depends on total income and 
the opportunity cost of engaging in sedentary activities, measured in terms of foregone wages 
and the costs associated with greater weight gain. The derivative of the optimal weight with 
respect to the wage rate is provided below: 
1 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 3 3 2 3 3
22 2 3 1 1 3 3 3
( ) (1 )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
a p p a a p p a A pF
w p p p p w p
β β β β β
β β β
∗ − − − − + −∂
∂ − + +
= −
     (43). 
The sign of this derivative depends on how the time spent in leisure activities changes as the 
wage rate increases. A sufficient condition for the person’s optimal weight to decrease as the 
wage rate increases requires non-wage income to be greater than the health expenditure per unit 
of weight, i.e., 3 3.A pb>
 
This negative effect of wages on weight is better understood if one 
looks at each component of the optimal weight. The optimal time allocated for home production 
decreases when the wage rate increases. The optimal demand for home-made meals also 
decreases with an increase in the wage rate, if the individual’s non-wage income is sufficiently 
large: 
1A w
α
α−≥           (44). 
This result, however, also states that for individuals with little or no non-wage income, a higher 
wage will increase the number of home-cooked meals. In other words, for a low income person, 
an increase in the wage rate induces the person to consume more of both home-made meals and 
ready-made meals, but the share of the healthy input decreases, which in turn increases the 
optimal weight. 
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3. The Effect of Tax 
The optimization problem with tax is summarized as follows: 
1 2, , ,
max
c l c t
   
1
1 1 2 1 2 2ln( ) ln( ) (1 )ln( )a c a l a a c tα α−+ + − −      (45), 
1 1 2 2 3(1 )(1 )w l t A p c p c p Fτ− − − + = + +       (46).
 
The Lagrangian has the following form: 
1 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 3( , , , ) ( (1 )(1 ) [ ])U c l c t w l t A p c p c p c c lλ τ β β β= + − − − + − − − − +L  (47). 
The modified first order conditions to the optimization problem are: 
1
0
c
∂
∂ =
L : 1
1 1 1 3
( ) 0a
c
p pλ β− + =
       (48), 
2
0
c
∂
∂ =
L : 1 2
2
(1 )
2 2 3( ) 0a ac p p
α λ β− − − − =
      (49), 
0l
∂
∂ =
L : 2 3 3( (1 ) ) 0al w pλ τ β− − + =        (50), 
0t
∂
∂ =
L : 1 2
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) 0a at w
α λ τ− − − − − =
       (51), 
0λ
∂
∂ =
L : 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 3(1 )(1 ) ( ) 0w l t A p c p c p c c lτ β β β− − − + − − − − + =   (52). 
Proposition 8 If A > β3p3, equations (45)–(47) together with the first-order conditions (48)-(52) 
imply that an increase in the tax rate increases the optimal weight: 
* 2 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 1
2 3 3 2 2 3 1 3 13 3
[(1 ) ] (1 )
(1 )[(1 ) ] 0
a w w A a w w a a a wF
w p p p p pw p
β τ β αβ β
τ τ β β βτ β
− + − −∂
∂ − + − +− +
= − + − >
   
 (53). 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Proposition 8 also suggests that increasing the tax rate increases the optimal weight, if the non-
wage income is greater than the per unit health expenditure, i.e, 3 3.A pβ>
 
In other words, if the 
weight loss from consuming more home-made meals is greater than the weight gain from 
 44 
consuming more ready-made meals, a higher tax will decrease the optimal weight. Furthermore, 
the effect of the tax on weight for low income earners is sensitive to the parameter values. The 
empirically testable implication of this model is that individuals with high incomes will 
optimally gain weight when the tax rate on income increases. The effect of a higher tax on 
weight for individuals with low income is uncertain.  
 
4. Testable Implications 
Incorporating home production into the model did not change the main result: the effect 
of income on weight is non-linear. Individuals with lower incomes may either increase or 
decrease their optimal weights as their incomes rise. Individuals with higher incomes, however, 
will unambiguously reduce their optimal weight just as predicted in the first model. One of the 
advantages of this model over the first one is that it provides a clear mechanism explaining how 
individuals allocate their time between home production and leisure. For example, the model 
implies that time-saving technologies in home production will lead to a greater use of the healthy 
input sold in the marketplace. The main lesson from the comparative static analyses in the 
previous sections is that the tax on income can have unintended consequences for the individual's 
weight. Namely, individuals whose labor supply is relatively responsive to the wage rate are 
more likely to lead a sedentary life style, consuming more high-density caloric foods. 
The implications of the model are consistent with the empirical evidence. Studies of the 
effect of taxes on labor supply for the US by Hausman (1981) and for the UK by Ashworth and 
Ulph (1981) suggest that for prime-aged males, labor supply elasticities vary with income. In 
particular, Hausman reports that the substitution effect dominates the income effect at all income 
levels, but that the responsiveness increases with income. Ashworth and Ulph report that for 
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individuals with low income the income effect dominates the substitution effect and the 
responsiveness also increases with income. In addition, empirical studies show that the labor 
supply responsiveness of married women is similar to that of prime-aged males, but the 
magnitude of the estimated elasticities is significantly larger for married women (Hausman 
1985). In other words, the burden of the income tax will fall heavier on the waistline of married 
women than of prime-aged men. 
 
5. Summary 
This chapter introduced a second model of how individuals rationally accumulate weight. 
The model is based on one period decision making where weight enters as a byproduct of 
consuming high-energy dense foods, leading a sedentary life style, and engaging in home 
production. The results of a comparative static analysis show that a higher marginal tax on 
income leads to an increase in weight both for high and average income individuals, but that it 
may lead to a decrease in weight for low income individuals under certain conditions.  
 The model has several intuitive implications. First, a higher tax reduces the opportunity 
cost of sedentary leisure activities and simultaneously reduces the opportunity cost of time for 
home production. A decrease in the wage income from higher taxes reduces the quantity of low-
energy density foods, which in turn reduces the quantity of home produced meals. A higher tax, 
therefore, increases the optimal demand for sedentary leisure activities relative to time allocated 
for home production. Second, the effect of a higher tax on weight is larger for individuals with 
more elastic supplies. 
The following chapters focus on empirical tests of the theoretical implications derived in 
this and the previous chapter.   
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CHAPTER V 
DATA 
 
1. Main Dataset 
The empirical analysis is based on two datasets. This chapter reviews the sources, 
structure, and limitations of each. In addition to these two datasets, a supplementary dataset was 
used to capture relevant factors as control variables. This section of the thesis is organized as 
follows. First, the state-level dataset is described. Second, the individual-level dataset is 
reviewed. Then, the sources and limitations of the supplementary dataset are discussed.  
 
1.1 State-level Dataset 
The data used in the state-level econometric analysis come from several secondary 
sources. State-level aggregate health outcome variables were obtained from the Centers for 
Disease Control’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System database. The state-level 
marginal tax rate variable was obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research.  
The data for “State and Local Expenditures” and “Personal Income” are obtained from 
information provided by the US Census Bureau’s State and Local Government Finances 
database.3 Demographic variables on race and population density also were obtained from the 
US Census Bureau. 
                                                          
3
 U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved April 4, 2010, from http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/. 
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1.2  Individual-level Dataset 
Individual-level observations were compiled from the Centers for Disease Control’s 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) survey conducted in 2006. The dataset 
contains approximately 340,000 cross-sectional observations.  
The BRFSS is an ongoing data collection program implemented in cooperation with the 
50 US states and its territories. The survey is designed to measure various health risks among 
individuals aged 18 years or older. The BRFSS was first conducted in 1984, and only 15 states 
participated in data collection that year. By 2001 all states and territories were engaged in 
collecting and reporting data. The data collections are uniform and state-specific, which makes it 
appropriate for the purpose of comparing individual health outcomes across states. Since the data 
are collected from a random sample drawn in each state via a telephone survey, it is nationally 
representative.  Although its primary interest is in assessing health risk factors associated with 
chronic disease, injuries, and preventable infectious disease, it also contains individual-specific 
demographic and socio-economic factors that are essential to the statistical analyses presented in 
what follows.  
The questionnaire consists of three major parts. The first part contains standard questions 
about basic health, demographic, and socio-economic conditions and this component is common 
to all states. The second part contains questions on specific health-related questions and this 
module differs from state to state. The third part contains questions developed by the states 
themselves and thus varies across them. This thesis uses the data from the first component. 
The 2006 survey adopted a disproportionate stratified sampling (DSS) design to ensure a 
nationally representative sample. This sampling method separates telephone numbers into two 
strata and then draws samples from each separately. The high-density stratum contains the 
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telephone numbers of a larger proportion of households than the medium-density stratum. If a 
household’s listed phone number belongs to a group of 100 numbers having the same area code, 
prefix, and first two digits of the suffix and all possible combinations of the last two digits that 
has one or more listed household telephone numbers, then the number is part of the high-density 
stratum. Otherwise, it is classified in the medium-density stratum. The high-density stratum is 
sampled at a disproportionately higher rate than the medium-density stratum to generate a 
representative sample.  
 
2. Supplementary Data 
In order to estimate the effects of county-level variables on individual BMI values, 
BRFSS’s supplementary public use dataset is used. The data cover all US counties. It includes 
variables on vital health indicators, environmental measures, crime statistics, business indicators, 
and poverty measures. There are 22 variables in the dataset from various sources compiled by 
CDC’s BRFSS program.  
In addition, the BRFSS dataset is matched to annual state-level sales tax and cigarette 
excise tax rates for 2006, which I obtained from The Tax Foundation and to annual state-level 
marginal income tax data for 2006 from The National Bureau of Economic Research.  
 
3. Data Sample Used in the Empirical Analysis 
The statistical analyses presented in this thesis are based on a sample that consists of 
roughly 184,000 adults aged 18 to 65 for whom measures of BMI and all independent variables 
are available for the year 2006. The total number of observations varies across various 
specifications, primarily due to data availability. Some econometric specifications contain 
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variables that the majority of respondents found easy to answer and other specifications contain 
missing information. Any observations with incomplete or missing data are omitted. The implicit 
assumption in doing so is that observations omitted in the analyses are missing randomly. Since 
most of the reduction in the number of observations comes from restricting the sample to 18 to 
65 year olds with complete BMI values, the risk of introducing bias in estimation from missing 
data is not large. Table 9 describes the variables in Table 10, Table 10 provides summary 
statistics for the state-level dataset, Table 11 provides summary statistics for the individual-level 
dataset, and Table 12 provides summary statistics for the county-level dataset. 
Table 9. Description of Variables in Table 10 
Variable Description Expected Sign 
Obesity Rate Percentage of people with BMI > 30 
 
State Health Expenditure Per 
Capita 
Total Expenditures on Health Divided 
by State Population Size + 
Personal Income Per Capita Total State Personal Income Divided by State Population Size + and - 
African-American Population Percentage of African-American Population + 
Hispanic Population Percentage of Hispanic Population + 
Population Density Population Density Per Square Mile +  
Marginal Income Tax Rate Average Marginal Income Tax Rate + 
Death Rate Mortality Rate From Ischemic Causes Per 100,000 State Population + 
Obs. 50 States and District of Columbia 
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Table 10. Mean Values of State-level Variables by Year (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Year Obesity 
Rate 
State Health 
Expenditure 
Per Capita 
Personal 
Income Per 
Capita 
African-
American 
Population                       
Percentage 
Hispanic 
Population 
Percentage 
Population 
Density Per 
Square Mile 
Marginal 
Tax Rate 
on Income 
Death 
Rate 
Obs 
1992 12.92 (2.00) 
4548 
(1459.6) 
18.11 
(2.96) 
12.05 
(14.17) 
6.1 
(9.83) 
0.35 
(1.35) 
25.01 
(2.53) 
129.13 
(32.09) 51 
1993 13.72 (2.17) 
4741.3 
(1505.6) 
19.2 
(3.11) 
12.78 
(14.52) 
6.19 
(10.14) 
0.35 
(1.33) 
25.2 
(2.46) 
127.55 
(33.13) 51 
1994 14.53 (2.04) 
4884.2 
(1436.9) 
19.31 
(3.97) 
12.79 
(14.43) 
6.33 
(10.33) 
0.36 
(1.39) 
25.43 
(2.54) 
123.51 
(31.38) 51 
1995 15.55 (2.30) 
5163.4 
(1489.6) 
20.89 
(3.25) 
12.85 
(14.53) 
6.37 
(10.36) 
0.35 
(1.27) 
25.64 
(2.51) 
121.37 
(31.16) 51 
1996 16.29 (2.32) 
5287.3 
(1452.7) 
22.2 
(3.67) 
12.91 
(14.55) 
6.41 
(10.3) 
0.34 
(1.24) 
25.2 
(2.53) 
116.95 
(30.37) 51 
1997 16.76 (2.32) 
5551.8 
(1483.9) 
23.85 
(3.59) 
12.96 
(14.55) 
6.43 
(10.22) 
0.34 
(1.24) 
25.68 
(2.55) 
113.43 
(31.25) 51 
1998 18.11 (2.50) 
5712.3 
(1524.6) 
24.78 
(3.85) 
13.49 
(14.82) 
6.62 
(10.82) 
0.34 
(10.20) 
25.93 
(2.64) 
109.63 
(30.46) 51 
1999 19.13 (2.68) 
6019 
(1547.4) 
26.16 
(4.05) 
13.72 
(14.94) 
6.7 
(11.01) 
0.34 
(1.19) 
26.19 
(2.56) 
104.81 
(28.58) 51 
2000 20.06 (2.39) 
6228.9 
(1553.7) 
28.64 
(4.70) 
13.96 
(15.05) 
6.79 
(11.20) 
0.36 
(1.31) 
26.34 
(2.60) 
103.91 
(27.78) 51 
All 
years 
16.34 
(3.24) 
5348.5 
(1579.1) 
22.57 
(4.98) 
13.06 
(14.5) 
6.44 
(10.39) 
0.35 
(1.27) 
25.62 
(2.56) 
116.70 
(31.82) 459 
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Table 11. Summary Statistics of BRFSS 2006 Dataset 
Variable Definition Range Mean (Std. Dev.) 
NBMI Body Mass Index 15-60 27.33 (5.73) 
white Caucasian 0, 1 0.69 (0.46) 
African-
American African American 0, 1 0.09 (0.29) 
Hispanic Hispanic 0, 1 0.14 (0.35) 
Hawaiian Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0, 1 0.004 (0.06) 
male Person is male 0, 1 0.52 (0.50) 
age Age 18-65 40.97 (12.85) 
married Person is married 0, 1 0.62 (0.48) 
divorced Person is divorced 0, 1 0.09 (0.29) 
widowed Person is widowed 0, 1 0.02 (0.14) 
income 
Less than $10,000=-5 
$10000< and <$15,000=-4 
$15,000< and <$20,000=-3 
$20,000< and <$25,000=-2 
$25,000< and <$35,000=-1 
$35,000< and <$50,000=0 
$50,000< and <$75,000=1 
More than $75,000=2 
-5 to 2 -0.02 (2.06) 
activesmoker Current smoker 0, 1 0.22 (0.42) 
pastsmoker Former smoker 0, 1 0.22 (0.41) 
sedentarylife Haven't exercised in the past 30 days 0, 1 0.21 (0.41) 
highschool High School graduate 0, 1 0.27 (0.44) 
collegedrop Attended college but did not graduate 0, 1 0.27 (0.45) 
college College graduate 0, 1 0.35 (0.48) 
N Number of Observations 218774 
Note: Means and standard deviations are weighted according to the BRFSS sampling criteria. 
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Table 12. Summary Statistics of Supplementary Data in BRFSS 2006 
Variable Definition Range Mean (Std. Dev.) 
pop2006 County population estimate 0-9948081 95258.82 (309167.20) 
poverty Percent of population living  below poverty line 0-39.43 13.38 (4.88) 
ervisits Emergency Room visits per  100,000 population 0-1252407 37344.61 (46495.63) 
hisps Percent of population Hispanic/Latino 0-50.4 3.23 (6.14) 
African-
Americans 
Percent of population  
African American 0-46.08 4.42 (7.63) 
fastfood Limited-service eating places  per 100,000 population 0-866.55 71.15 (39.23) 
fitness Fitness and recreation sports 
 centers per 100,000 population 0-110.8 9.33 (9.24) 
employmt Less than 65 percent of residents  21 to 64 years old employed 0, 1 0.15 (0.35) 
N  Number of Observations 
 
3064 
State Level Variables  
   
mtax  Marginal tax on income 20.58-32.85 26.19 (2.58) 
sales tax State sales tax 0-7 5.03 (1.59) 
cigtax Excise tax on cigarettes per pack 0.07-2.46 1.01 (0.64) 
N  Number of Observations 
 
51 
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CHAPTER VI 
ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
 
1. Panel Data Model 
The first part of the empirical investigation uses a panel data regression approach to 
examine the association between the average BMI and the marginal income tax rate at the state 
level. The panel data regression method is used for three reasons. First, this approach results in 
more accurate estimates of model parameters, because it has more degrees of freedom, less 
multicollinearity, and greater sample variability than cross-sectional or time series data alone 
(Hsia 2007). Second, it controls for the effect of omitted variables (ibid., Baltagi 2007). Third, it 
makes it possible to isolate the effect of the marginal income tax rate on state-level average 
BMIs by explicitly controlling for other unobserved state-specific factors that may be associated 
with the dependent variable.  
 
1.1 General Form 
The baseline state-level BMI data generating process is assumed to be of the following 
form: 
BMIit = β1 + β2X2it + β3X3it + . . . + βkXkit + εit, for i = 1, 2…I and, t = 1, 2 …T. (54), 
where the error term εit is independent and identically distributed across states and over time and 
E(εit2|xit) = σ2 , for I = 51 states and T = 9 years, resulting in 459 complete observations. The key 
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feature in this setup is that the intercept and slopes are assumed to be constant across states and 
over time. If these assumptions were valid, then using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on pooled 
data would be sufficient for unbiased and efficient parameter estimation. Unfortunately, these 
assumptions cannot be justified in the real world. 
 
1.2 Fixed-Effect vs. Random-Effect Specifications 
Both the fixed-effect and random-effect models allow for the intercept term β1 in 
equation (16) to vary across states but keep slope coefficients constant across states. Both models 
can be written as 
BMIit = β1i + β2X2it + β3X3it + . . . + βkXkit + εit, for i = 1, 2…I and, t = 1, 2 …T. (55), 
where the intercept term β1 is allowed to vary across states. The difference between the two 
models lies in the restrictions imposed on the relationship between the intercept and the other 
explanatory variables. In the fixed-effect model, we simply assume that the intercept term is 
state-specific and it is allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variables. On the other hand, 
the random-effect model assumes that the intercept term consists of two parts: the overall mean 
and the state-specific random term. This state-specific random term is further assumed to be 
independent of the values of the explanatory variables. In other words, the intercept term has the 
following properties: 
β1i = α + vi with E(vi| Xit) = 0 and E(vi2| Xit) = constant    (56). 
Another practical difference between these models is that time-invariant explanatory 
variables cannot be estimated using the fixed-effect model. However, the fixed-effect model will 
generate unbiased estimators even if the random-effect model’s assumptions are satisfied. If 
specified incorrectly, the fixed effect estimators will be inefficient. On the other hand, if the 
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random-effect model is estimated when the unobserved state-specific variables are correlated 
with the explanatory variables, the estimators will be biased. The standard approach for 
determining which of these models is more appropriate for the sample data is the Hausman 
(1978) test. The Hausman test statistic is based on differences between the estimated covariance 
matrix for coefficient estimates from the fixed-effect model and the random-effect model: 
H =  (bFE − bRE)’[Var (bFE ) − Var(bRE)]−1(bFE − bRE)    (57), 
where H is distributed Chi-squared with K (the total number of explanatory variables) degrees of 
freedom. In the empirical analysis below, the results of the Hausman test as well as Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation, the LR test for heteroscedasticity, and the Fisher test for cointegration in 
panel data are reported.  
 
2. Multi-level Model 
The second part of the econometric analysis uses the BRFSS dataset based on individual-
level variables. The dataset is generated from a survey with a complex sampling design, which 
contains multiple levels, i.e., individual observations are nested in counties and counties nested 
in states. Using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method on pooled data will ignore the 
grouping effect, which in turn leads to the violation of the assumption of independently 
distributed error terms in the statistical model and will generate inefficient estimates (Steenberg 
and Jones 2002; Steenbergen, Marco, and Bradford 2002). In practical terms, the inferences 
based on OLS will be invalid, since the reported standard errors will be artificially low and the 
confidence intervals will be artificially narrow.  Put differently, combined individual state and 
federal marginal tax rates, given by combined rate = state rate + federal rate (1-state rate), are not 
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independent since individuals in any given state will have greater similarity to others within that 
state. Since the correlation between the errors (individual observations) in the context of my 
study is likely to be positive, the consequences of using OLS will be similar to the case when 
there is a positive autocorrelation and the estimated standard errors will be too small. 
The multilevel structure of the BRFSS dataset offers a richer analytical framework. This 
thesis is primarily concerned with the effect of the marginal income tax on BMI. Using the OLS 
method on pooled data, even after controlling for a variety of relevant factors, will generate a 
single estimate which presupposes that the causal effect is uniform across all counties or states. 
Multilevel analysis, on the other hand, can incorporate explicitly varying causal effects of the 
marginal income tax rate on BMI conditional on higher level contextual groupings, i.e., counties 
and states. 
Furthermore, multilevel analysis allows for simultaneous estimation of the effects of the 
explanatory variables at various levels. An individual’s BMI is likely to be influenced by state-
level variables such as healthcare spending. In the context of OLS, one would have to either 
include state dummies or state-level healthcare spending, but not both, since these two variables 
will be collinear. Including healthcare spending only would ignore the differences in BMI arising 
from important state-specific factors beyond what is captured by the healthcare spending 
variable. The multilevel model conveniently can accommodate simultaneously both the 
individual-level variables and the state-level variables (Gelman and Hill 2007).  
The basic form of the multilevel specification is a random intercept model with no 
independent variables. The model can be expressed as 
BMIijk = γ + υk + ujk + eijk        (58), 
υk ~ N(0,σ2υ), 
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ujk ~ N(0,σ2u), 
eijk ~ N(0,σ2e). 
The dependent variable is the average BMI for the ith individual in county j and state k. This 
model estimates the overall mean BMI, denoted γ, state-specific group mean, denoted υk, and 
county-specific group mean, denoted ujk. The estimation is conducted using the Maximum 
Likelihood method in STATA’s version 10 software. The program estimates the Best Linear 
Unbiased Predictors for the random effects, i.e., state- and county-specific intercepts. 
Furthermore, the estimation results report variance decompositions that reveal the proportion of 
BMI variability due to differences between states, counties, and individuals.  
 The second statistical model enters additional explanatory variables and is expressed as 
follows: 
BMIijk = γ + ∑pβ1pXpijk+ ∑qβ2qZqjk + ∑rβ3rGrk + υk + ujk + eijk   (59), 
υk ~ N(0,σ2υ), 
ujk ~ N(0,σ2u), 
eijk ~ N(0,σ2e). 
The right-hand-side variables X are individual-level variables (e.g., an individual’s age), those 
labeled Z are county-level variables (e.g., the number of fast food restaurants in a given county), 
and those labeled G are state-level variables (e.g., the sales tax rate in a given state). 
 
3. Conditional Quantile Model 
As opposed to the Ordinary Least Squares method, which estimates the responses of the 
conditional mean of the dependent variable to the changes in the independent variables, the 
conditional quantile regression technique estimates the response of the dependent variable at 
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specified quantiles of the conditional distribution. It provides a better picture of how the entire 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable responds to the changes in the independent 
variables. 
The quantile regression estimation is used as described in Koenker and Bassett (1978). It 
is a semi-parametric method, as there are no assumptions made about the conditional distribution 
of the dependent variable. The quantile regression model can be expressed as follows: 
BMIi = β'kXi + εki         (60), 
Gk(BMIi | Xi) = β'kXi         (61), 
where βk is a vector of regression coefficients, Xi is a vector of independent variables, εki is an 
error term, Gk(BMIi | Xi) is the conditional quantile of BMI for the ith person given Xi, and k is 
the indicator for the quantile. The optimization problem that solves for optimal values of the 
regression coefficients can be summarized in the following way: 
min ∑i Gk(BMIi - β'kXi | Xi)        (62). 
The marginal change in the kth conditional quantile from a unit change in the jth independent 
variable in Xi, is given by  
ij
iik
kj X
)X|(BMIG
β
∂
∂
=
         (63). 
In addition to avoiding the heteroscedasticity problem in estimation, the most appealing 
feature of the quantile regression method is that the marginal effect of any independent variable 
is allowed to vary across quantiles. In this thesis, the theoretical models suggest that the 
responsiveness of labor supply to changes in the marginal income tax rate will play an important 
role in determining the magnitude of the tax effect on BMI. The empirical studies clearly suggest 
that the labor supply responsiveness is greater for females than for males. Using the quantile 
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regression method, not only the effect of the marginal income tax rate on individuals with higher 
BMIs in comparison to those with lower BMIs can be ascertained but also the differences in 
effects for males and females can be determined. 
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CHAPTER VI 
VARIABLES 
 
1. Introduction 
 This chapter provides rationales for the study’s choice of independent variables and 
discusses the hypothesized effects of each on BMI. These variables are classified into three 
distinct groups:  demographic variables, contextual variables, and policy variables. Demographic 
variables include both individual and aggregate measures. Contextual variables refer to 
environmental factors affecting multiple individuals belonging to distinct groups. For example, a 
poor person living in a poor county may have a different attitude towards healthy dietary choices 
than a poor person who lives in a rich county. Policy variable refers to the marginal tax rate 
variable.   
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the hypothesized effects of state-
level variables. Section 3 describes individual-level variables and their expected impacts on 
BMI. That section also explains why including contextual variables is important and explores 
how each of them may influence BMI. Section 4 explains the choice of tax variables and how 
each is expected to affect BMI. Section 5 discusses potential deficiencies.  
 
2. State-level Variables 
2.1 State and Local Expenditure Per Capita 
State subsidies reduce the real price of health services. To capture this effect state and 
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local health expenditure per capita is used. This variable was obtained from the US Census 
Bureau's State and Local Government Finances database.4 Since lowering the cost of healthcare 
services reduces the opportunity cost of gaining weight, the expected sign of the coefficient on 
this variable is positive.  
 
2.2 Personal Income and Personal Income Squared 
The theoretical models presented in Chapters III and IV suggest that income has a non-
linear effect on BMI. At lower levels of income, the effect of income on BMI is positive. At 
higher levels of income, however, the effect of income on BMI is predicted to be negative. To 
account for the non-linear theoretical relationship, the square of income per capita is included 
along with the income per capita variable. Personal income data were obtained from the US 
Census Bureau's State and Local Government Finances database. 
 
2.3 Race and Ethnicity 
The medical literature suggests that body mass exhibits strong racial differences. Chapter 
II addressed in detail the dangers of attributing differences in BMI to race per se. Some of the 
differences in BMI across races may have to do with the distinct dietary choices common to each 
group. Empirical studies of obesity consistently find that the average BMIs for African-
Americans and Hispanics are substantially greater than for Caucasians and Asian-Americans. 
Therefore, the sign on coefficients for African-American and Hispanic origin variables is 
expected to be positive. The race and ethnicity variables were obtained from the US Census 
Bureau.  
                                                          
4
 U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved January 8, 2011, from http://www.census.gov/govs/www/financegen.html. 
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2.4 Population Density 
Population density captures a multitude of important factors that may influence obesity 
rates. Greater population density is indicative of a more urban population. On average, urban 
populations tend to be better educated than rural populations. At the same time, the opportunity 
cost of time tends to be higher in urban areas. Fast-food restaurants are more concentrated in 
urban areas. It is unclear how population density affects obesity rates. The data for this variable 
were obtained from the US Census Bureau. 
 
2.5 Death Rate 
 Individuals may have perverse incentives to gain weight if they know that advances in 
medical science can minimize its harmful consequences. The sign on the coefficient for this 
variable is expected to be positive. The death rate per state from various heart-related causes 
among individuals between the ages of 35 and 64 is used to proxy the effect of medical 
technological improvements. The data for this variable were obtained from the CDC’s publicly 
available database.5 A summary of the characteristics of state-level variables by year is given in 
Table 9. 
 
3. Individual-level Variables 
The dependent variable is a measure of a person's BMI and is calculated from self-
reported height and weight. Since morbidly obese and extremely underweight individuals most 
likely suffer from serious medical conditions, their behavioral responses to economic factors can 
                                                          
5
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Retrieved May 1, 2010, from 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality_tables.htm. 
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be confounded. Furthermore, there are not many individuals with extreme BMI values. For these 
reasons, only individuals with BMI values ranging from 15 to 60 are included in the dataset. The 
BMI distribution is skewed to the right with almost one quarter of the samples individuals falling 
into the obese category that corresponds to BMI values equal to and greater than 30. Visual 
inspection clearly indicates that the distribution is not symmetric about the officially defined 
"healthy" BMI range of 18.5 to 25. 
Table 10 reports the means and standard deviations of the individual-level variables used 
in the analysis. The BRFSS variables are computed based on the BRFSS's final sampling 
weights. 
The average BMI across the sample for individuals aged 18 to 65 years with BMI values 
greater than 15 and less than 60 is 27.33. The average BMI for active smokers is 0.8 units or 
2.9% lower than that for non-smokers (27 versus 27.8). The average age for this sample is 41. A 
preliminary review of the data suggests that the average BMI increases up to certain age and then 
starts to decline. The age at which the BMI reaches its highest average value is 55. Sixty nine 
percent of the sample is white, 9% is African-American, and 14% is Hispanic. The respondents 
of African-American heritage have a higher average BMI than any other race (29.78 for African-
Americans versus 27.41 for others). Sixty-two percent of the sample are married. Eleven percent 
did not complete high school, 27% completed high school, 27% had some college education, and 
35% completed a four-year college degree.  The respondents who have a high school degree are 
on average 5.7% heavier than the respondents with a college degree (28.19 versus 26.66). The 
BRFSS data on income consist of eight income categories. These were standardized around the 
mean income interval of $35,000 to $50,000. 
The state and county level variables are summarized in Table 11. The average county 
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population is 95,259. The total number of counties in the sample is 3064. This number is less 
than the actual number of counties because data were not available for some of them. The 
variable measuring emergency room visits captures overall health conditions in counties. The a 
priori expectation is that individuals living in counties with high emergency room visits are 
associated with unhealthy life styles. Low-income individuals frequently use emergency rooms 
for services that do not require immediate care because they lack proper medical insurance. 
Furthermore, Billings and Mijanovich (2000) report that patients receiving primary care services 
in emergency rooms have worse health outcomes than those treated in private physicians’ offices 
or other settings. The variables measuring the percentages of African-Americans and Hispanics 
are included to account for the unobserved dietary preferences arising from peer effects within 
counties. The average number of fast food establishments per county in the sample is 71. The 
standard deviation is 39, which is sufficiently large to allow for identification of the effect of the 
availability of fast food on the mean individual BMI response. The variable measuring the 
number of fitness centers in counties is included to account for the healthy trends in lifestyle. 
The expected sign on this variable, therefore, is negative. The dummy variable indicating a high 
unemployment rate (employment = 1 if less than 65% of the adult population is employed) is 
included to account for county-level economic conditions. 
 
4. Policy Variable 
4.1 State Level Marginal Income Tax Rate 
A variable of primary interest is the marginal income tax rate. It represents the average 
marginal federal plus state income tax rate on various income brackets. The TAXSIM model 
determines the state's total tax liability and then recalculates by assuming a one percent increase 
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in income for each taxpayer. The ratio of the additional tax to the additional income multiplied 
by 100 is defined as the marginal tax rate. These calculations account for the cross deductibility 
of state and federal taxes for itemizers in certain states. The TAXSIM model used for these 
computations accounts for all major and most minor features of the tax code, including minimum 
and maximum taxes, credits, phase-outs, and itemization status. The dataset is constructed by 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The theoretical model developed in Chapters 
III and IV predicts that the marginal income tax rate will have positive effects on BMI. 
Therefore, the expected sign of the marginal tax rate coefficient is positive. 
The state-level data include the marginal income tax, sales tax, and excise taxes on 
cigarettes. The average marginal income tax rate across states was 26.19%. The marginal income 
tax ranged from 20.58% in Wyoming to 32.85% in Washington, D.C. in 2006. The wealthier 
states generally had higher marginal taxes on wage earning. The small standard deviation (2.58) 
indicates that there is not much variation in the marginal income tax rate across states. The 
average sales tax across states is 5% with a standard deviation of 1.59%. Alaska, Delaware, 
Montana, and New Hampshire have no sales tax. The highest sales tax rate (7%) is reported for 
Indiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. The excise tax on cigarettes is 
included to have a better account of the effect of smoking on the mean BMI response of 
individuals. The excise tax on cigarettes ranged from 7 cents per pack in South Carolina to $2.46 
in Rhode Island. 
 
4.2 Simulated Individual-level Tax Rate Variable 
Although the BRFSS dataset does not include individual tax information, it has data on 
state, income, marital status, the number of children per household, and age. The NBER's 
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TAXSIM 9 allows one to calculate individual tax liabilities and tax rates based on individual-
specific information. It is an online tax simulation program that computed individual tax 
liabilities under the federal and state tax laws over the period 1960 to 2013. On the basis of 
respondents’ household incomes, marital status, state, and number of children, TAXSIM 9 
determines the federal marginal income tax rate for each person. The TAXSIM 9’s processed 
BRFSS dataset yields a new variable that approximates the actual federal marginal tax rate.  
Table 13. Simulated Individual Federal Marginal Income Tax Rates 
Income Interval ($) No. of Obs. Per Interval Mean Std.Dev. 
0 – 9,999 8595 - 17.43 14.09 
10,000 - 14,999 7898 0.68 11.83 
15,000 – 19,999 10814 12.64 6.59 
20,000 – 24,999 14105 16.24 9.05 
25,000 – 34,999 20684 19.31 9.30 
35,000 – 49,999 30238 18.73 4.99 
50,000 – 65,000 35591 18.12 4.63 
More than 65,000 56437 22.35 4.71 
Total 184362 16.78 11.25 
 
Summary statistics are provided in Table 13. The average for the federal marginal income tax 
rate in the sample is 16.78%. The minimum marginal tax rate is -40%, representing the effect of 
subsidy from the government's Earned Income Tax Credit program for the poor. The variation in 
the federal marginal income tax rate declines over the income range. In this part of the analysis, 
the aim is to exploit the variation in federal marginal income tax rates within each income level 
arising from differences in marital status and number of children.  
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5. Summary 
 The decision as to the variables to include was based on (1) the theoretical models 
presented in Chapters III and IV, and (2) what other researchers have used as control variables. 
Since the survey does not provide information about the marginal tax rates on income, the next 
best alternative is employed. Individual-level marginal tax rates are simulated using NBER’s 
TAXSIM software.  The advantage of using the simulated marginal tax rates is that the impact of 
taxes on BMI can be estimated with greater precision and in a meaningful way. But that choice 
does not come costlessly. If the simulated tax rates are not close to the actual tax rates that 
individuals face, not only is the coefficient on the marginal tax rate biased but in addition the 
coefficients on all other independent variables also are meaningless.  
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CHAPTER VII 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
1.  Introduction 
In this chapter the implications of the theoretical models are tested using two datasets. 
The first dataset consists of state-level aggregated panel data for the years 1992 through 2000. 
This dataset is used to test the implied null hypothesis that the income tax has no effect on body 
mass. The second dataset consists of individual-level cross-sectional data collected by the 
Centers for Disease Control's Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) in 2006. 
This dataset has two distinct advantages over data aggregated across states or time. First, it 
contains 180,910 observations, which allow for more precise estimation of the parameters. 
Second, since the models developed in the previous chapters focus on individual decision 
making, such a dataset is more suitable to that end. Using a micro-level dataset, to a certain 
extent, brings the study closer to controlled experiment. This dataset, however, has some flaws, 
too. One disadvantage of the second dataset is that it does not have corresponding tax variables. 
Since the BRFSS dataset does not track the same individuals over time, it does not capture their 
time-wise behavior as accurately as longitudinal datasets might do. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the empirical results from the analysis of the 
aggregated dataset are presented. Then, to ensure that the results are robust, the micro-level 
dataset to assess the effects of income tax policy on body mass is used. The interpretation and 
implications of the results conclude the chapter. 
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 2. Panel Data Estimation 
The panel data regression approach is employed to estimate the effect of the combined 
state-federal marginal income tax rate on obesity while controlling for demographic variables 
and state-specific effects. Before proceeding with the estimation, several diagnostic tests are 
carried out. The results of the diagnostic tests are summarized in Table 14 and discussed along 
with the subsequent estimation results. 
 
Table 14. Diagnostic Test Results for State-level Data 
Hausman Test of 
FE vs. RE 
Wooldridge Test 
for AR(1) 
In Panel data 
LR Test 
for Heteroscedasticity 
in Panel Data 
Fisher Test 
for Cointegration 
in Panel Data 
2χ (7)=304.52 
P-value=0.0000 
F(1,50)=11.42 
P-value=0.0014 
2χ (50)=220.8 
P-value=0.0000 
2χ (102)=304.26 
P-value=0.0000 
 
 
The results of the Hausman test suggest that a fixed-effects model is more appropriate 
than a random-effects one. The estimates for level data using a fixed effect regression are shown 
in Table 15. The coefficient on the marginal income tax rate is 0.34 when the variance-
covariance matrix is allowed to have a general form with AR (1) serial correlation and 
heteroscedastic disturbances. This estimated value is converted into an elasticity to get a more 
familiar interpretation. The elasticity around the mean is computed as the ratio of mean values 
for the marginal income tax rate and obesity multiplied by the estimated coefficient. In this case, 
the elasticity is equal to 0.5. 
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Table 15. Estimates of Fixed Effects Regression with State-level  Data (Standard Errors in 
Parentheses) 
Variable FE FE (Het. 
Robust) 
FE (Autocor. 
and Het. 
Robust) 
FE (with 
AR(1)) 
FE (with 
AR(1) and Het. 
Robust) 
Marginal Tax 
Rate  
0.3273a 0.3273b  0.3273 0.3439a  0.3439b  
-0.1148 -0.141 -0.2128 -0.1267 -0.1494 
State and Local 
Expenditure Per 
Capita  
0.0026a  0.0026a  0.0026a  0.0024a  0.0024a  
-0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 
Personal Income 
Per Capita 
0.2063b 0.2063 0.2063 0.1035 0.1035 
-0.0901 -0.1818 -0.2914 -0.1117 -0.218 
Personal Income 
Per Capita 
Squared 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
-0.0017 -0.0028 -0.0049 -0.0023 -0.0039 
Black Population 
Percentage  
0.4394a  0.4394a  0.4394a  0.5509a  0.5509a  
-0.1174 -0.1182 -0.1654 -0.177 -0.1746 
Hispanic 
Population 
Percentage  
0.2109 0.2109c  0.2109c  0.2797 0.2797c  
-0.1312 -0.1164 -0.1128 -0.1811 -0.1576 
Population 
Density  
2.5935b  2.5935 2.5935b  3.1905b  3.1905 
-1.0231 -1.7853 -1.2207 -1.3341 -2.877 
Rho  -  -  -  0.2070a  0.2070a  
-0.0572 -0.0752 
R2  0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 
Note: a, b and c denote significance level for two-tailed test at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
 
For a one percent increase in the marginal income tax rate one can expect a one-half 
percentage point increase in the obesity rate. The average marginal income tax rate for all states 
is 25% and the average obesity rate is 16%. Thus, if the average marginal tax rate rises from 25% 
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to 27.5%, the average obesity rate is expected to rise from 16% to 16.8%. 
This result is consistent with the primary hypothesis that emerges from the theoretical 
models presented in earlier chapters. Additional diagnostic tests suggest that the data exhibit 
first-order cointegration between the marginal tax rate and obesity. 
The model is re-estimated by first-differencing the observations and by including a linear 
time trend in order to solve the problem of spurious regression. Table 16 shows the results for the 
differenced data. The effect of the marginal income tax rate still has a statistically significant 
positive impact on obesity rates at conventional significance levels (one-tailed test p-value = 
0.0014). 
The effect of state and local healthcare subsidies per capita are expected to be positive. 
The estimated value for the coefficient is consistent with the initial conjecture that state and local 
expenditures will increase the obesity rate by reducing the real price of healthcare services. 
Moreover, this variable is statistically significant under all specifications (one-tailed test p-value 
= 0.000256). If the state expenditure per capita rises by a one percent, then one can expect a 0.85 
percent increase in the obesity rate. 
Per capita income is expected to have a non-linear effect on the obesity rate, i.e., initially 
as income per capita increases also raising the obesity rate, then, beyond a certain level of 
income, increases in income are expected to have a negative effect on obesity. Although the 
signs are consistent with the a priori expectations, the coefficient estimates are statistically 
insignificant (one-tailed test p-value = 0.32).
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Table 16. Estimates for State-level First Differenced Data (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Variable Pooled OLS Pooled OLS 
(Corrected for 
heteroscedasticity) 
Pooled OLS 
(Corrected for 
autocorrelation & 
heteroscedasticity) 
Pooled OLS 
with AR(1) 
Error 
Pooled OLS  
with AR(1) Error 
(corrected for 
heteroscedasticity) 
Marginal Tax Rate 0.3587
a
 
(0.1187) 
0.3587a 
(0.1225) 
0.3587a 
(0.1379) 
0.3444b 
(0.1281) 
0.3444b 
(0.1386) 
Death Rate -0.0116 (0.0125) 
-0.0116 
(0.0147) 
-0.0116 
(0.01379) 
-0.0116 
(0.0136) 
-0.0116 
(0.0146) 
State and Local 
Healthcare Expenditures 
Per Capita 
0.0013a 
(0.0004) 
0.0013a 
(0.0004) 
0.0013a 
(0.0004) 
0.0019a 
(0.0004) 
0.0019a 
(0.0004) 
Personal Income 
Per Capita 
-0.1364 
(0.1178) 
-0.1364 
(0.1654) 
-0.1364 
(0.1099) 
0.0071 
(0.1056) 
0.0071 
(0.1769) 
Personal Income 
Per Capita Squared 
0.0052c 
(0.0029) 
0.0052c 
(0.0035) 
0.0052c 
(0.0026) 
0.0015 
(0.0025) 
0.0015 
(0.0034) 
African-American 
Population Percentage 
0.7137a 
(0.1849) 
0.7137a 
(0.1941) 
0.7137a 
(0.1654) 
0.8518a 
(0.2157) 
0.8518a 
(0.2178) 
Hispanic Population 
Percentage 
0.1512 
(0.2404) 
0.1512 
(0.1779) 
0.1512 
(0.2312) 
0.1081 
(0.2087) 
0.1081 
(0.1677) 
Population Density 3.0854
b
 
(1.4614) 
3.0854b 
(1.7136) 
3.0854b 
(1.4361) 
2.3991c 
(1.2798) 
2.3991c 
(1.3810) 
 
Rho - - - 
-0.4096a 
(0.0513) 
-0.4096a 
(0.0616) 
R2 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.11 0.11 
      Note: a, b and c denote significance level for two-tailed test at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Rashad and Grossman's (2004) results indicate that the number of fast-food restaurants 
per capita explains substantial variation in the obesity rate. As the density of fast-food restaurants 
depends on population density, the population density is expected to have a positive effect on the 
obesity rate. The estimate for this variable has the expected sign, and it is also statistically 
significant (one-tailed test p-value = 0.045). 
Traditional African-American and Hispanic diets are on average rich in high caloric 
foods. Therefore, a larger population percentage of African-Americans and Hispanics are 
expected to be associated with higher obesity rates. The estimates show that the percentage of 
African-Americans has a statistically significant effect on the obesity rate (one-tailed test p-value 
= 3.7*10-5), but the percentage of Hispanics is not statistically significant under all robust 
specifications (one-tailed test p-value = 0.24). For a one percent increase in the population 
percentage of African-Americans we can expect a 0.44 percent increase in the obesity rate. 
Advances in medical science, particularly in the treatment of heart problems, may have 
reduced the relative price of obesity-related illnesses. Therefore, one can reasonably expect that 
advances in medical technology would increase the obesity rate. The proxy variable for medical 
technology, age adjusted death rate per 100,000, turned out to have the expected sign, but it was 
statistically insignificant (one-tailed test p-value = 0.212). Table 17 shows the detailed results of 
the estimation.
 
 
  
74 
Table 17. Estimates for State-level Data with Time Trend and Death Rate (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Variable Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
(Heteroscedasti 
city robust) 
Fixed Effect 
(Autocorrelation & 
heteroscedasticity 
Robust) 
Fixed Effect 
with AR(1) 
Error 
Fixed Effect 
with AR(1) Error 
(heteroscedasticity 
Robust) 
Marginal Tax Rate 0.2029
c
 
(0.1049) 
0.2029c 
(0.1212) 
0.2029c 
(0.1288) 
0.2109c 
(0.1147) 
0.2109 
(0.1317) 
Death Rate 0.0190 (0.0118) 
0.0190 
(0.0131) 
0.0190 
(0.0139) 
0.0141 
(0.0133) 
0.0141 
(0.0157) 
 
State and Local 
Expenditure Per Capita 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
 
Personal Income  
Per Capita 
0.0113 
(0.0845) 
0.0113 
(0.0786) 
0.0113 
(0.0846) 
-0.0100 
(0.1008) 
-0.0100 
(0.1159) 
 
Personal Income  
Per Capita Squared 
-0.0013 
(0.0016) 
-0.0013 
(0.0015) 
-0.0013 
(0.0019) 
-0.0012 
(0.0020) 
-0.0012 
(0.0020) 
 
African-American 
Population Percentage 
0.2845a 
(0.1075) 
0.2845b 
(0.1133) 
0.2845b 
(0.1380) 
0.3640b 
(0.1520) 
0.3640b 
(0.1601) 
 
Hispanic Population 
Percentage 
0.0610 
(0.1201) 
0.0610 
(0.1205) 
0.0610 
(0.1686) 
0.1017 
(0.1548) 
0.1017 
(0.1488) 
Population Density -0.9911 (0.9986) 
-0.9911 
(1.4652) 
-0.9911 
(1.2394) 
-1.3765 
(1.2641) 
-1.3765 
(2.3119) 
         Note: Details are provided in the following page.
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     Table 17 (continued). Estimates for State-level Data with Time Trend and Death Rate (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Variable Fixed Effect Fixed Effect 
(Heteroscedasti 
city robust) 
Fixed Effect 
(Autocorrelation & 
heteroscedasticity 
Robust) 
Fixed Effect 
with AR(1) 
Error 
Fixed Effect 
with AR(1) Error 
(heteroscedasticity 
Robust) 
 
Time trend 0.8764
a
 
(0.0930) 
0.8764a 
(0.0984) 
0.8764a 
(0.1140) 
0.9652a 
(0.1136) 
0.9652a 
(0.1256) 
 
Rho - - - 
0.1190b 
(0.0552) 
0.1190 
(0.0723) 
R2 0.90 0.90 0.90  0.89 
 
0.89 
F 58.6 58.6 58.36 - - 
        Note: a, b and c denote significance level 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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3. Mixed Multilevel Model and Quantile Regression Estimation: State-Level Marginal 
Income Tax Rate Variable 
3.1 Mixed Multilevel Model 
First, to establish baseline results, a basic random intercept model is estimated with 
several intercept terms but with no independent variables. The model is written compactly as: 
 ijk k jk ijkBMI v u eg= + + +         (64), 
2(0, )k vv N d: ,  
 
2(0, )jk uu N d: , 
 
2(0, )ijk ee N d: . 
The dependent variable is the BMI for individual i in county j and state k. This model 
estimates the overall mean BMI g , the state-specific group mean kv , and the county-specific 
group mean jku . The estimation is conducted using the Maximum Likelihood method in 
STATA 10 software. The model estimates the Best Linear Unbiased Predictors for the random 
effects, i.e., state and county specific intercepts. Furthermore, the estimation results include 
variance decomposition. The total number of observations is 184,042. The number of counties 
for which relevant variables were available is 1145. The minimum and maximum number of 
observations per county ranged from 21 to 2634. Upon estimating the model, the overall mean 
BMI is 27.64 for all respondents between the ages of 18 and 65 and with reported BMI values 
ranging from 15 to 60. About 1.2% of the total variation in BMI is due to the mean difference 
across counties, 0.8% of the total variation is due to the mean difference across states, and 98% 
of the total variation is due to differences in individual-specific characteristics. 
Next, independent variables at both the county and state levels are added to the model. 
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The primary conditioning variable of interest in this chapter is the marginal income tax rate. 
Specifically, it is the average value of the combined federal and state marginal income tax for 
each state in 2006. The variable was obtained from the NBER's TAXSIM project. With a mixed 
multilevel model, the state-level and county-level variables can be combined with the individual-
level data to ascertain the effect of taxes on individual BMI outcomes, while accounting for the 
grouping and random effects at the state and county levels. Before proceeding to the results, 
visual inspection of the data will clarify a more appropriate model specification. In the panel data 
regression, the marginal income tax is assumed to have a linear effect on the state-level 
conditional mean of BMI. Upon visual inspection of the relationship between the tax rate and the 
average BMI for each state, it appears that the marginal income tax rate has a quadratic effect. 
Figure 2 illustrates this point. 
 
Figure 2. Average BMI per State and Marginal Income Tax Rate. 
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To account for the observed non-linear effects of the marginal income tax rate, a squared tax 
term is also included. The statistical model is rewritten as follows: 
1 2 3 4 5( )ijk p pijk q qjk r rk k k k jk ijkp q rBMI X Z G Tax Tax Tax v u eγ β β β β β= + + + + + ∗ + + +∑ ∑ ∑  (65), 
 
2(0, )k vv N d: , 
2(0, )jk uu N d: ,  
2(0, )ijk ee N d: .  
The results of estimating the multilevel mixed model are reported in Table 18. The effect 
of the marginal income tax rate is nonlinear and statistically significant in two models. The third 
model, including county-level explanatory variables, suggests that the marginal income tax rate 
is not robust in all specifications. The marginal income tax rate is positively associated with BMI 
up to 25%, and then the effect reverses. The marginal income tax rate effects in Model 1 and 
Model 2 are statistically significant at 10%; it is statistically insignificant in Model 3. According 
to the CDC, an average male weighs 191 pounds and has a height of 5'10", and the average 
woman weighs 164.3 pounds and is 5'4" tall. Given these averages, an increase in BMI by one 
unit corresponds to a mean weight change of 6.9 pounds for men and 5.8 pounds for women. The 
size of the effect in Model 1 suggests that increasing the marginal tax rate from 21% to 23% is 
associated with about a 0.22 unit increase in BMI. This model estimates the response of the 
conditional mean of BMI. The mean tax rate across states is 26% with a standard deviation of 
2.58%. Increasing the tax rate by one percentage point at its mean value is associated with a 0.06 
unit decrease in the conditional mean of BMI. African-Americans were the heaviest ethnic 
group, in terms of mean BMI differences across ethnic groups. That result is robust to all model 
specifications. The group mean difference between individuals who never   
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Table  18. Multilevel Model Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset: State-level Tax Rates 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error 
Mtax 0.7921c -0.3471 0.7524c -0.3326 0.2101 -0.3008 
Mtaxsq -0.0163c -0.0067 -0.0152c -0.0065 -0.0043 -0.0059 
White -0.1407c -0.0597 -0.1413c -0.0597 -0.1359c -0.0596 
African-
American 2.0062
a
 -0.0752 2.0011a -0.0753 2.0189a -0.0758 
Hispanic 0.2194b -0.0781 0.2167b -0.0781 0.2469b -0.0786 
Male 1.0366a -0.0274 1.0367a -0.0274 1.0358a -0.0274 
agedemean 0.0440a -0.0013 0.0440a -0.0013 0.0440a -0.0013 
agedemeansq -0.0032a -0.0001 -0.0032a -0.0001 -0.0032a -0.0001 
Married -0.0856c -0.0384 -0.0860c -0.0384 -0.1010b -0.0384 
Divorced -0.4095a -0.0471 -0.4097a -0.0471 -0.4104a -0.0471 
Widowed 0.0101 -0.0771 0.0092 -0.0771 0.0037 -0.0771 
income -0.3455a -0.0108 -0.3457a -0.0108 -0.3362a -0.0109 
incomesq -0.0208a -0.0032 -0.0208a -0.0032 -0.0196a -0.0032 
activesmoker -1.2732a -0.0354 -1.2733a -0.0354 -1.2718a -0.0354 
pastsmoker 0.3350a -0.0332 0.3354a -0.0332 0.3389a -0.0331 
highschool -0.3272a -0.0591 -0.3260a -0.0591 -0.3198a -0.0591 
collegedrop -0.3183a -0.0603 -0.3168a -0.0603 -0.3023a -0.0603 
college -1.4290a -0.062 -1.4276a -0.062 -1.4034a -0.062 
salestax - - 0.0648c -0.0301 0.0465 -0.0275 
cigtax - - -0.1850c -0.0899 -0.0576 -0.0838 
POP2006 - - - - -1*10-10a 1*10-10 
ERVISITS - - - - 1*10-10 1*10-10 
POVERTY - - - - 0.0387a -0.0087 
HISPS - - - - -0.0160b -0.0051 
AFRICAN-
AMERICANS      - -           -       - -0.0122
b
 -0.0044 
FASTFOOD - - - - -0.0042a -0.0011 
FITNESS - - - - -0.0292a -0.0045 
EMPLOYMT - - - - -0.0633 -0.0913 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively. The 
last eight variables in capital letters refer to county characteristics. 
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smoked and those who actively smoke is about 1.3 units of BMI. This result also is robust to 
several different model specifications. On average, the conditional mean of BMI is 1.4 units 
lower for college graduates than for those who did not complete high school. The conditional 
mean of BMI for a divorced person is almost half a point lower than for that of a single person. I 
include the state-level variables "sales tax" and “cigarette excise tax” in the model as control 
variables. The estimate of the coefficient for the sales tax variable suggests that it is positively 
associated with BMI, whereas the cigarette excise tax is negatively associated with BMI. Both of 
these variables are statistically significant at 10%, but become statistically insignificant upon 
inclusion of county-level variables. The effects produced by entering county-level variables are 
somewhat surprising. For example, the coefficients on the population percentages of African-
American and Hispanic are negative, implying that counties with more ethnic minorities, ceteris 
paribus, have lower BMIs. Even more surprising is the negative association of fast-food 
restaurants with BMI. Consistent with expectations, the number of fitness centers is negatively 
associated with BMI. Almost all county-level variables were statistically significant except for 
Emergency Room visits and Employment variables.  
 
3.2 Conditional Quantile Estimation 
The theoretical model including home production suggests that females may have greater 
responsiveness to marginal tax rate changes, since their labor supply is more elastic with respect 
to changes in the wage rate. A visual inspection of the data (not shown in here) suggests that the 
responsiveness of BMI to the marginal income tax rate among females is greater than that of 
males. Furthermore, the responsiveness at different parts of the conditional distribution of BMI 
for females may shed light on how the effect of marginal income tax rate varies across quantiles. 
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Specifically, the 25th, 50th, and 75th conditional quantiles of BMI are estimated for both 
females and males. The results of the estimation are provided in Table 19 and Table 20, 
respectively. The effect of the marginal income tax rate, which was statistically insignificant 
after adding the county-level variables to the multilevel mixed model, reappears in the 75th 
quantile of BMI. Figure 3 provides a visual illustration of the estimation results. 
 
Figure 3. Quantile Regression for Females.
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Table 19. Quantile Regression Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset: State-level Tax Rates 
(Females) 
  OLS 25th Quantile 50th Quantile 75th Quantile 
Variable Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error 
mtax 0.8512 0.2578 -0.0775 0.0954 0.1068 0.1254 0.4335 0.2188 
mtaxsq -0.0165 0.0050 0.0013 0.0018 -0.0023 0.0024 -0.0086 0.0042 
salestax - - 0.0008 0.0054 0.0310 0.0104 0.0582 0.0116 
cigtax - - 0.0320 0.0252 -0.0309 0.0336 0.0048 0.0555 
white 0.4038 0.1627 -0.1366 0.0884 -0.1900 0.0853 -0.0365 0.0981 
African-
American 3.2325 0.2092 2.4041 0.1135 2.7637 0.1109 2.9827 0.1180 
Hispanic 1.2610 0.2234 0.6911 0.1201 0.5187 0.1217 0.0557 0.1589 
agedemean 0.0591 0.0034 0.0551 0.0015 0.0683 0.0018 0.0654 0.0027 
agedemeansq -0.0036 0.0003 -0.0014 0.0001 -0.0025 0.0001 -0.0043 0.0002 
married -0.4501 0.1149 -0.0877 0.0652 -0.3411 0.0665 -0.9442 0.0781 
divorced -0.7849 0.1356 -0.4027 0.0855 -0.7275 0.0897 -1.3054 0.1155 
widowed -0.5008 0.2006 -0.2345 0.0800 -0.3506 0.1116 -0.8786 0.1626 
income -0.4595 0.0302 -0.2154 0.0095 -0.4530 0.0176 -0.7728 0.0230 
incomesq -0.0550 0.0096 -0.0301 0.0030 -0.0465 0.0053 -0.0645 0.0075 
activesmoker -0.6677 0.0975 -0.7524 0.0412 -0.9234 0.0482 -1.2835 0.0665 
pastsmoker 0.5329 0.0936 0.2407 0.0368 0.2627 0.0480 0.4365 0.0787 
highschool -0.5307 0.1887 -0.4328 0.0797 -0.6979 0.1095 -0.5462 0.1559 
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Table 19 (continued). Quantile Regression Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset: State-level 
Tax Rates (Females) 
  OLS 25th Quantile 50th Quantile 75th Quantile 
Variable Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error 
college -1.8934 0.1886 -1.3739 0.0825 -1.9311 0.1329 -2.0845 0.1579 
pop2006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
poverty 0.0434 0.0130 0.0329 0.0056 0.0449 0.0073 0.0599 0.0096 
hisps -0.0259 0.0080 -0.0194 0.0027 -0.0292 0.0035 -0.0356 0.0072 
African-
Americans -0.0251 0.0061 -0.0113 0.0034 -0.0193 0.0035 -0.0268 0.0059 
fastfood 0.0001 0.0018 -0.0048 0.0008 -0.0046 0.0009 -0.0039 0.0016 
fitness -0.0623 0.0087 -0.0162 0.0032 -0.0285 0.0035 -0.0447 0.0054 
N 183590 108334 108334 183590 
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Table 20. Quantile Regression Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset: State-level Tax Rates 
(Males) 
  
OLS 25th Quantile 50th Quantile 75th Quantile 
Variable Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error 
mtax -0.0021 0.0055 0.2021 0.1255  0.2676 0.1231 0.3303 0.1976 
mtaxsq 0.1061 0.2872 -0.0042 0.0024  -0.0054 0.0024 -0.0067 0.0039 
salestax - - 0.0037 0.0108  0.0249 0.0097 0.0541 0.0123 
cigtax - - 0.0453 0.0381  0.0541 0.0386 -0.0067 0.0503 
white 0.6970 0.1748 0.2664 0.0702  0.1437 0.0652 0.0671 0.1114 
African-
American 1.6365 0.2195 1.1115 0.0953  1.1665 0.0890 1.3496 0.1473 
Hispanic 1.0081 0.2240 0.8381 0.0809  0.6571 0.1127 0.3034 0.1917 
agedemean 0.0232 0.0034 0.0256 0.0018  0.0262 0.0019 0.0242 0.0025 
agedemeansq -0.0036 0.0003 -0.0024 0.0001  -0.0028 0.0001 -0.0032 0.0002 
married 0.7011 0.1129 0.7540 0.0528  0.7690 0.0488 0.7428 0.0842 
divorced 0.3658 0.1727 0.4163 0.0742  0.2978 0.0909 0.2018 0.1215 
widowed 0.7580 0.3057 0.2778 0.1278  0.5835 0.1716 0.5319 0.2161 
income 0.0011 0.0303 0.1170 0.0124  0.0299 0.0160 -0.1360 0.0273 
incomesq -0.0057 0.0104 -0.0083 0.0046  0.0024 0.0059 0.0027 0.0078 
activesmoker -0.6522 0.1084 -0.9195 0.0488  -0.8996 0.0521 -1.1396 0.0659 
pastsmoker 0.4068 0.0923 0.4068 0.0458  0.4616 0.0400 0.4052 0.0691 
highschool -0.1124 0.1821 0.0577 0.0958  -0.1432 0.0880 -0.3589 0.1063 
collegedrop 0.0424 0.1807 0.1545 0.1022  -0.1452 0.0962 -0.3540 0.1315 
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Table 20 (continued). Quantile Regression Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset: State-level 
Tax Rates (Males) 
  
OLS 25th Quantile 50th Quantile 75th Quantile 
Variable Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error 
college -1.0321 0.1820 -0.5888 0.1044  -1.0929 0.0932 -1.5990 0.1300 
pop2006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
poverty 0.0274 0.0129 0.0176 0.0053  0.0226 0.0070 0.0302 0.0097 
hisps -0.0251 0.0079 -0.0177 0.0037  -0.0257 0.0030 -0.0301 0.0050 
African-
Americans -0.0213 0.0058 -0.0102 0.0026  -0.0127 0.0035 -0.0155 0.0061 
fastfood -0.0073 0.0022 -0.0039 0.0012  -0.0050 0.0008 -0.0070 0.0011 
fitness -0.0372 0.0092 -0.0159 0.0028  -0.0243 0.0041 -0.0302 0.0058 
N 183684 75821 75821 75821 
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4. Mixed Multilevel Model and Quantile Regression Estimation: Individual-Level Marginal 
Tax Rate 
4.1. Multilevel Model Estimation 
In this section, the following model is estimated: 
1 2 3 4 5( )ijk p pijk q qjk r rk k ijk k jk ijkp q rBMI X Z G Tax Tax Income v u eγ β β β β β= + + + + + ∗ + + +∑ ∑ ∑   (66), 
2(0, )k vv N δ: , 
2(0, )jk uu N δ: ,  
2(0, )ijk ee N δ: . 
Tax denotes the individual federal marginal income tax rate for person i in county j and 
state k. The results of estimating the multilevel mixed model are reported in Table 21. At the 
mean income level of $57,500, an increase in the marginal income tax rate by 10% leads to 
approximately a 0.22 increase in BMI. In terms of weight, this corresponds to about 1.54 pounds 
for an average male and 1.32 pounds for an average female. The result is statistically significant 
at the 1% confidence level. The separate models for females and males indicate that the effect of 
the federal marginal income tax rate change on BMI is greater for females. The model controls 
for the effects of marital status, numbers of dependents, age, race, smoking status, health, and 
education. Furthermore, the state-level policy variables -- per capita total spending and per capita 
health spending -- are included to control for possible confounding effects. In addition to state-
level variables, several county-level factors are controlled for, including poverty rates, 
employment, education, population percentages of African-Americans and Hispanics, the 
number of fitness centers, and the number of fast-food restaurants. The results suggest that 
residing in a poorer county is positively associated with BMI. Having more fitness centers and
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 Table 21. Multilevel Model Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Data with Individual-level Tax Rates 
Variable Base Model Females Only Males Only 
marginal tax -0.019745a (0.0023) -0.0141209a (0.0029) -0.0160668a (0.0040) 
marginal tax*income 7.22*10-7a (1*10-10) 6.59*10-7a (1*10-10) 5.21*10-7a (1*10-10) 
spending 1*10-10 (1*10-10) 1*10-10 (1*10-10) 1*10-10 (1*10-10) 
healthexp -0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0001 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002) 
white -0.0597 (0.0594) -0.1900402c (0.0847) 0.1528729c (0.0774) 
African-American 2.004267a (0.0756) 2.330756a (0.1044) 1.091687a (0.1044) 
depx 0.0456947b (0.0144) -0.0166 (0.0198) 0.0346 (0.0202) 
male 1.068424a (0.0273) -  - - -  
Hispanic 0.2188415b (0.0784) 0.1119 (0.1102) 0.4031021a (0.1047) 
agedemean 0.0411617a (0.0014) 0.050731a (0.0020) 0.0218442a (0.0019) 
agedemeansq -0.0031088a (0.0001) -0.0033349a (0.0001) -0.0029804a (0.0001) 
married -0.0392 (0.0420) -0.4933975a (0.0596) 0.6636129a (0.0562) 
divorced -0.4192327a (0.0472) -0.883889a (0.0645) 0.1670846c (0.0665) 
widowed 0.0247 (0.0771) -0.5815882a (0.0950) 0.2775 (0.1488) 
income -0.0000173a (1*10-10) -0.000025a (1*10-10) 0.0000105c (1*10-10) 
income squared -1.87*10-10a (1*10-10) -2.38*10-10a (1*10-10) -2.35*10-10a (1*10-10) 
activesmoker -1.374849a (0.0353) -1.375341a (0.0493) -1.24236a (0.0482) 
pastsmoker 0.3338623a (0.0330) 0.3613825a (0.0467) 0.3918515a (0.0443) 
sedentarylife 1.492501a (0.0338) 1.812705a (0.0462) 0.980802a (0.0474) 
highschool -0.1937071b (0.0590) -0.3866412a (0.0832) -0.0696 (0.0790) 
collegedrop -0.0878 (0.0604) -0.2870387a (0.0848) 0.0621 (0.0814) 
college -1.108735a (0.0622) -1.384352a (0.0880) -0.8859462a (0.0830) 
POVERTY 0.0330444a (0.0081) 0.0397902a (0.0105) 0.024108b (0.0090) 
HISPS -0.0218924a (0.0048) -0.0207008a (0.0062) -0.0258693a (0.0052) 
Note: Details are provided in the following page.           
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Table 21 (continued). Multilevel Model Estimates for BRFSS 2006 with Individual-level Tax Rates 
 Variable Base Model Females Only Males Only 
AFRICAN-
AMERICANS -0.013207b (0.0041) -0.0154309b (0.0053) -0.0151835a (0.0045) 
FASTFOOD -0.0042025a (0.0010) -0.0043629b (0.0014) -0.0041168a (0.0012) 
FITNESS -0.0278656a (0.0044) -0.0314144b (0.0058) -0.0244153a (0.0048) 
EDUCATN 0.1062 (0.0883) 0.1013 (0.1149) 0.1053 (0.1056) 
EMPLOYMT -0.0539 (0.0929) -0.1003 (0.1197) -0.0042 (0.1089) 
Constant 29.83737a (0.2885) 31.04007a (0.3893) 29.07837a (0.2879) 
N 184042.0000         108277.0000      75765.0000   
Note: a, b, and c denote significance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively.  
      
Table 22. Multilevel Model Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset with Combined Federal and State Marginal Tax 
Rate 
 Variable combined female male 
fedstaterate -0.0168954a (0.00210560) -0.0119453a (0.00266310) -0.014327a (0.00361850) 
totinctax 6.23*10-7a (0.00000007) 5.69*10-7a (0.00000009) 4.30*10-7a (0.00000010) 
spending -0.0000233 (0.00001370) -0.0000257 (0.00001770) -0.0000163 (0.00001170) 
healthexp -0.0000605 (0.00018260) 0.0000431 (0.00023590) -0.0001726 (0.00015340) 
white -0.0612657 (0.05934070) -0.1919253c (0.08469000) 0.1509363 (0.07744730) 
African-
American 2.012732
a
 (0.07542170) 2.335321a (0.10442600) 1.094104a (0.10441040) 
male 1.067337a (0.02727850) - - - - 
Hispanic 0.2097489b (0.07824600) 0.1123 (0.11018000) 0.4037434a (0.10474170) 
depx 0.0405753b (0.01425500) -0.0206005 (0.01967850) 0.0284722 (0.01999950) 
             Note: Details are provided in the following page. 
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Table 22 (continued). Multilevel Model Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset with Combined Federal and State 
Marginal Tax Rate 
 Variable combined female male 
agedemean 0.0410876a (0.00142360) 0.0507268a (0.00203150) 0.0218287a (0.00189710) 
agedemeansq -0.0030989a (0.00009500) -0.0033317a (0.00013440) -0.0029723a (0.00012720) 
married -0.0482416 (0.04200620) -0.5007887a (0.05954360) 0.6530471a (0.05621750) 
divorced -0.4186724a (0.04714530) -0.8851035a (0.06446250) 0.1689711c (0.06645330) 
widowed 0.0206431 (0.07711480) -0.5857051a (0.09496920) 0.2784178 (0.14876420) 
pwages -0.0000194a (0.00000335) -0.0000269a (0.00000461) 0.0000104c (0.00000468) 
pwagessq -1.73*10-10a (0.00000000) -2.26*10-10a (0.00000000) -2.31*10-10a (0.00000000) 
activesmoker -1.372497a (0.03531850) -1.37494a (0.04931320) -1.242155a (0.04820380) 
pastsmoker 0.3359139a (0.03298020) 0.3616409a (0.04674670) 0.3918375a (0.04432610) 
sedentarylife 1.491829a (0.03379590) 1.812127a (0.04618130) 0.9812327a (0.04742590) 
highschool -0.1957395a (0.05894220) -0.3879725a (0.08316380) -0.0723914 (0.07900520) 
collegedrop -0.0908757 (0.06031210) -0.2895156a (0.08482460) 0.0584769 (0.08135020) 
college -1.113305a (0.06210550) -1.388744a (0.08800040) -0.8907883a (0.08300030) 
POVERTY 0.0351149a (0.00814290) 0.0396734a (0.01054480) 0.0240352b (0.00897040) 
HISPS -0.0207694a (0.00485000) -0.0204947a (0.00621250) -0.0256143a (0.00522660) 
AFRICAN-
AMERICANS -0.0145035
a
 (0.00413550) -0.0153669b (0.00533190) -0.0152555a (0.00449140) 
FASTFOOD -0.0042179a (0.00105210) -0.0043788b (0.00136220) -0.0041308a (0.00117880) 
FITNESS -0.0276775a (0.00439070) -0.0313374a (0.00581410) -0.0243075a (0.00482660) 
EDUCATN 0.088925 (0.08815220) 0.1032902 (0.11492020) 0.1045558 (0.10556880) 
EMPLOYMT -0.0608341 (0.09276720) -0.1012489 (0.11973630) -0.0043667 (0.10890710) 
Constant 29.98148a (0.30233420) 31.11395a (0.39136250) 29.13081a (0.28901830) 
N 184042   108277 75765 
Note: a, b, and c denote significance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively. 
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fast-food restaurants have a negative effect on BMI. The impact of fast-food restaurants is 
somewhat puzzling, since one would expect that a greater availability of high-energy dense foods 
would be positively associated with BMI. One possible explanation is that the county-level 
density of fast-food restaurants is driven by the average income of residents, and the estimate 
here is confounded by an omitted variable. The most surprising result is that living in counties 
with larger Hispanic and African-American populations is negatively associated with BMI. It 
suggests that a negative peer effect may be operating. 
Consistent with the existing literature on obesity, the effect of income is more 
pronounced for females than for males. The results of estimations that use combined federal and 
state marginal income taxes are presented in Table 22. The estimated effect of the marginal tax 
conditional on income is similar to the estimates in Table 21, but the magnitude of the effect is 
slightly lower (6.59*10-7 vs. 5.69*10-7 for females and 5.21*10-7 vs. 4.30*10-7 for males).  
 
4.2 Quantile Regression Estimation 
In order to gain a better understanding of how the federal marginal income tax rate 
affects BMI of females relative to males, the quantile regression model is estimated in a similar 
fashion to that presented in the previous section. The main difference between this model and the 
previous one is that individual-level marginal income tax rates are used instead of the state-level 
average marginal income tax rates. The results of the estimation for females are presented in 
Table 23. The quantile regression estimates for male respondents are presented in Table 24. The 
effect of the marginal income tax rate on BMI increases substantially as one moves toward the 
upper quantiles. The negative association between income and BMI also increases as we move  
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Table 23. Quantile Regression Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset: Females 
 
 
Variable  q10   q25   q50 
mtax*income 1*10-10 (1*10-10) 2.67*10-7b (1*10-10) 6.22*10-7a (1*10-10) 
mtax (0.0028) (0.0037) -0.0072401c (0.0034) -0.0147216b (0.0045) 
income 0.0000228a (1*10-10) 1*10-10 (1*10-10) (1*10-10) (1*10-10) 
income sq. -2.94*10-10a (0.0000) -2.23*10-10a (1*10-10) -3.16*10-10a (1*10-10) 
spending 1*10-10 (1*10-10) (1*10-10) (1*10-10) -0.0000206a (1*10-10) 
health exp. (0.0001) (0.0001) (1*10-10) (0.0001) 1*10-10 (0.0001) 
white (0.0877) (0.0774) (0.0578) (0.0757) (0.0916) (0.0840) 
African-
American 1.934894a (0.0888) 2.391507a (0.0903) 2.707986a (0.1132) 
Hispanic 0.7193999a (0.1149) 0.7024257a (0.1044) 0.500413a (0.1248) 
agedemean 0.0404555a (0.0016) 0.0544258a (0.0018) 0.0634727a (0.0024) 
agedemeansq -0.0009803a (0.0001) -0.0013669a (0.0001) -0.0024374a (0.0002) 
married 0.0770 (0.0462) (0.0531) (0.0470) -0.2596527a (0.0627) 
divorced -0.1794566b (0.0559) -0.417507a (0.0591) -0.744638a (0.0721) 
widowed (0.1565) (0.1059) (0.2380) (0.1298) -0.325143c (0.1293) 
activesmoker -0.7598967a (0.0441) -0.8283411a (0.0463) -1.034816a (0.0501) 
pastsmoker 0.2299336a (0.0413) 0.2440005a (0.0415) 0.2582196a (0.0473) 
sedentarylife 0.2572026a (0.0470) 0.7834377a (0.0455) 1.653018a (0.0558) 
highschool -0.2885452a (0.0875) -0.3827887a (0.0846) -0.507559a (0.1099) 
collegedrop -03540994a (0.0981) -0.4605531a (0.0742) -0.5512549a (0.1077) 
college -0.876915a (0.0904) -1.230022a (0.0758) -1.586103a (0.1163) 
POVERTY 0.0276269a (0.0060) 0.0309344a (0.0049) 0.0434616a (0.0074) 
HISPS -0.0199154a (0.0037) -0.0253065a (0.0040) -0.0284287a (0.0038) 
AFRICAN-
AMERICANS -0.0133679a (0.0029) -0.0132865a (0.0033) -0.0201678a (0.0033) 
FASTFOOD -0.0036745a (0.0009) -0.0038512a (0.0007) -0.0038856a (0.0009) 
FITNESS -0.0099743a (0.0030) -0.0165979a (0.0030) -0.0277151a (0.0039) 
EDUCATN 0.2557536b (0.0969) 0.2154182b (0.0696) 0.1761 (0.1216) 
EMPLOYMT (0.1206) (0.0839) (0.0168) (0.0771) -0.2040991c (0.0952) 
Constant 21.33759a (0.1861) 24.48015a (0.1427) 28.96352a (0.1521) 
Note: Details are provided in the following page. 
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Table23 (continued). Quantile Regression Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset: Females 
 Variable    q75   q90 
mtax*income   9.99*10-7a (1*10-10)   1.37*10-6a (1*10-10) 
Mtax   -0.0304078a (0.0061)   -0.0277781b (0.0089) 
Income   -0.0000272b (1*10-10)   -0.0000912a (1*10-10) 
income sq.   -4.15*10-10a (1*10-10)   (1*10-10) (1*10-10) 
Spending   -0.0000361a (1*10-10)   -0.0000521b (1*10-10) 
health exp.   0.0002958* (0.0001)   0.0004 (0.0002) 
White   (0.0130) (0.1228)   0.2437 (0.2124) 
African-
American   2.91704
a
 (0.1281)   3.111181a (0.2401) 
Hispanic   (0.0772) (0.1475)   (0.2098) (0.3554) 
Agedemean   0.054337a (0.0031)   0.0292334a (0.0047) 
Agedemeansq   -0.004183a (0.0002)   -0.0065429a (0.0004) 
Married   -0.8349533a (0.0978)   -1.211237a (0.1551) 
Divorced   -1.340034a (0.0909)   -1.541288a (0.1476) 
Widowed   -0.9126937a (0.1702)   -1.357091a (0.2625) 
Activesmoker   -1.469285a (0.0752)   -2.072148a (0.1153) 
Pastsmoker   0.4003767a (0.0644)   0.4705423a (0.1078) 
Sedentarylife   2.730881a (0.0692)   3.841945a (0.0978) 
Highschool   -0.3877282c (0.1610)   (0.3129) (0.2287) 
Collegedrop   (0.2178) (0.1639)   0.0709 (0.2443) 
College   -1.627663a (0.1649)   -1.708915a (0.2459) 
POVERTY   0.0599527a (0.0120)   0.0713306b (0.0233) 
HISPS   -0.0315863a (0.0059)   -0.0318826b (0.0117) 
AFRICAN-
AMERICANS   -0.0316603a (0.0043)   -0.0324242a (0.0075) 
FASTFOOD   -0.004581b (0.0014)   -0.0052045c (0.0021) 
FITNESS   -0.0435356a (0.0074)   -0.0640581a (0.0108) 
EDUCATN   (0.0410) (0.1487)   (0.2419) (0.3078) 
EMPLOYMT   (0.1896) (0.1435)   (0.4238) (0.2713) 
Constant   34.86424a (0.3897) 42.32209a (0.5829) 
N   108277         
             Note: a, b, and c denote significance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively. 
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Table 24. Quantile Regression Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset: Males 
Variable  q10 q25  q50 
mtax*income 1*10-10 (1*10-10) 2.26*10-7c (1*10-10) 3.99*10-7a (1*10-10) 
mtax -0.0072 (0.0059) -0.0068 (0.0043) -0.0164582a (0.0032) 
income 0.0000496a (1*10-10) 0.0000367a (1*10-10) 0.0000204a (1*10-10) 
incomesq -3.66*10-10a (1*10-10) -3.14*10-10a (0.0000) -2.39*10-10a (1*10-10) 
spending 1*10-10 (1*10-10) 1*10-10 (1*10-10) 1*10-10 (1*10-10) 
healthexp -0.0001952b (0.0001) -0.0002139a (0.0001) -0.0001844c (0.0001) 
white 0.3532134a (0.0787) 0.2766282a (0.0659) 0.1588157c (0.0744) 
African-
American 0.8461842a (0.1105) 1.066573a (0.1487) 1.15457a (0.1187) 
Hispanic 0.9116461a (0.1064) 0.8349174a (0.0881) 0.6282747a (0.0898) 
agedemean 0.0221032a (0.0018) 0.0240821a (0.0015) 0.0228363a (0.0015) 
agedemeansq -0.0022879a (0.0001) -0.0024262a (0.0001) -0.0027284a (0.0001) 
married 0.6571381a (0.0596) 0.7782706a (0.0552) 0.8137223a (0.0527) 
divorced 0.4237819a (0.0858) 0.4033889a (0.0664) 0.3228096a (0.0828) 
widowed 0.3308 (0.1826) 0.2931273c (0.1488) 0.6477865a (0.1185) 
activesmoker -0.8938825a (0.0574) -0.9201478a (0.0587) -0.9334041a (0.0550) 
pastsmoker 0.377706a (0.0504) 0.4161064a (0.0397) 0.4380513a (0.0421) 
sedentarylife -0.0061 (0.0618) 0.3122154a (0.0595) 0.7494011a (0.0544) 
highschool 0.2488089b (0.0945) 0.0841 (0.0918) -0.1093 (0.0917) 
collegedrop 0.3180015b (0.0990) 0.2073058c (0.0945) -0.0702 (0.0931) 
college -0.2338693c (0.1068) -0.5144669a (0.1092) -0.9684144a (0.0850) 
POVERTY 0.0184906b (0.0071) .0233108a (0.0059) 0.0198821a (0.0060) 
HISPS -0.0187267a (0.0037) -0.0211419a (0.0033) -0.030882a (0.0035) 
AFRICAN-
AMERICANS -0.0103039b (0.0032) -0.0122646a (0.0034) -0.0146764a (0.0035) 
FASTFOOD -0.0037696a (0.0010) -0.0032651a (0.0008) -0.003804a (0.0007) 
FITNESS -0.0095341b (0.0032) -0.0159701a (0.0027) -0.0250388a (0.0038) 
EDUCATN 0.0466 (0.1407) 0.1965 (0.1157) 0.2468221c (0.0990) 
EMPLOYMT -0.1330 (0.1110) -0.1996 (0.1066) -0.0063 (0.1092) 
Constant 21.50856a (0.1859) 24.01666a (0.2128) 27.69735a (0.2204) 
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Table 24 (continued). Quantile Regression Estimates for BRFSS 2006 Dataset: Males 
Variable                q75 q90 
mtax*income 5.85*10-7a (1*10-10) 1.01*10-6a (1*10-10) 
mtax -0.0169491b (0.0063) -0.0285007b (0.0090) 
income 1*10-10 (1*10-10) -0.0000309b (1*10-10) 
incomesq 1*10-10 (1*10-10) 0.0000 (1*10-10) 
spending 1*10-10 (1*10-10) -0.0000268c (1*10-10) 
healthexp -0.0002 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0002) 
white 0.1543 (0.1317) 0.1109 (0.1714) 
African-American 1.448119a (0.1902) 1.620386a (0.2728) 
Hispanic 0.3126 (0.1662) -0.0834 (0.2658) 
agedemean 0.0192201a (0.0025) 0.0135072a (0.0039) 
agedemeansq -0.0030311a (0.0002) -0.0037546a (0.0003) 
married 0.7826031a (0.0745) 0.5141538a (0.1519) 
divorced 0.2043747c (0.0955) -0.3541751c (0.1719) 
widowed 0.5369513b (0.1658) 0.1610 (0.4360) 
activesmoker -1.227525a (0.0793) -1.664997a (0.1158) 
pastsmoker 0.3936357a (0.0702) 0.3919747b (0.1278) 
sedentarylife 1.447319a (0.0816) 2.423287a (0.1372) 
highschool -0.2295 (0.1610) -0.1045 (0.2580) 
collegedrop -0.1415 (0.1424) 0.1677 (0.2288) 
college -1.308224a (0.1507) -1.389054a (0.2376) 
POVERTY 0.0250627c (0.0105) 0.0308697c (0.0147) 
HISPS -0.0329781a (0.0045) -0.040191a (0.0083) 
AFRICAN-
AMERICANS -0.0165452b (0.0055) -0.0177185c (0.0072) 
FASTFOOD -0.0059236a (0.0013) -0.0049885b (0.0019) 
FITNESS -0.0327788a (0.0047) -0.040825a (0.0055) 
EDUCATN 0.0848 (0.1087) 0.1317 (0.2494) 
EMPLOYMT 0.0873 (0.1267) -0.0832 (0.2343) 
Constant 32.23456a (0.3697) 37.72087a (0.4512) 
N  75765       
             Note: a, b, and c denote significance levels at 0.1%, 1%, and 5% respectively. 
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Figure 4. Quantile Regression Coefficients for Females: Marginal Income Tax Rate, Income, 
and Interaction. 
 
toward the upper quantiles. Figure 4 illustrates the primary findings for females. The average 
income range for females in the sample is approximately 30,000 to 50,000 dollars. The average 
marginal tax rate in that income range is approximately 19% with a standard deviation of 9%. 
The estimate of the marginal tax rate conditional on income for females suggests that increasing 
the tax rate by one standard deviation in the 25th quantile is associated with an increase in BMI 
by 0.1 units and in the 75th percentile by 0.34 units, a more than three-fold increase in the 
magnitude of the effect. 
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5. Summary 
 The results of empirical investigation of both the state-level and the individual-level 
datasets indicate that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
marginal tax rate on income and BMI. The analysis of the state-level dataset suggests that a one-
percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate on income is associated with 0.2 to 0.36 
percentage increase in the conditional mean of the state-level obesity rate. In other words, a one 
standard deviation increase (2.5%) in the marginal tax rate is associated with approximately 
0.8% increase in the state-level obesity rate. Since variation in the state-level obesity rates is 
substantially lower than the individual-level obesity rate, the reported estimates of the marginal 
tax rate on income at the state-level may not be convincing and may well be a result of a simple 
correlation. 
 The primary hypothesis that emerges from the theoretical models presented in this thesis 
is that there is a positive relationship between a person’s BMI and the marginal tax rate on 
income. Given the availability of the marginal tax rate data only at the state-level, initially the 
relationship between the individual-level BMI and the state-level marginal tax rate is estimated 
using the multilevel linear model. After controlling for the individual-level demographic and 
socio-economic factors, the county-level socio-economic factors, and the state-level economic 
factors, an increase in the marginal tax rate is found to be positively associated with BMI for the 
tax rates less than 25% and is negatively associated with BMI for the tax rates exceeding 25%. 
For example, the effect of increasing the marginal tax rate from 21% to 23% is associated with 
0.22 unit increase in BMI. With the inclusion of the county-level control variables, the 
coefficient on the tax variable becomes smaller and statistically insignificant. The results of the 
state-level marginal income tax regressions need to be interpreted with caution. As noted earlier, 
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the differences in the marginal income tax rate across states may be associated with some of the 
county-level variables as a result of a simple ecological correlation, which can render the 
estimates imprecise. A priori, one would expect that a higher marginal income tax rate would be 
associated with greater BMI values because the theoretical models outlined in this thesis clearly 
indicate that as the marginal income tax increases the substitution effect should be substantial. I 
find instead that BMI exhibits a non-linear response to the marginal income tax rate. If the 
coefficient on the marginal income tax rate is capturing some state-specific effects, then 
analyzing the relationship between the individual-level marginal tax rate and BMI should solve 
the problem. In other words, the true coefficient on the tax variable may still be positive.  
 Using the NBER’s TAXSIM 9 tax simulator, the individual-level marginal income tax 
rate variable is generated. There are two reasons why this simulated variable may be superior to 
the state-level marginal income tax rate variable. First, it has a greater variance, which increases 
the precision of the coefficient estimates. Second, since the theoretical models deal with the 
individual’s decision making, it is more appropriate variable than the state-level average 
marginal income tax rate. 
 Two distinct statistical models are estimated. First, the multilevel linear model is used to 
ascertain the mean response of BMI to the changes in the individual-level marginal tax rate. The 
results of combined regression suggest that at the mean income level of $57,500 a ten-percentage 
point increase in the marginal income tax rate is associated with approximately 1.54 pound 
increase in weight for males and 1.32 pounds for females. 
 Second, the quantile regression model is employed to estimate the effect of the marginal 
income tax rate at five quantiles (10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th) of the BMI distribution. The 
results were consistent with the theoretical predictions. Furthermore, the estimates suggest that 
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the effect of the marginal income tax rate for females is greater in magnitude than for males. The 
most surprising finding is that a higher tax rate is associated with substantially higher BMI in the 
upper quantiles. For example, at the income level of $40,000 a one standard deviation increase in 
the marginal income tax rate is associated with 0.1 unit increase in BMI at the 25th quantile and 
0.34 unit increase in BMI at the 75th quantile for females (significant at 1% level).  
 There are, however, three important factors that must be stated clearly. First, the 
simulated individual-level tax rates are used, which may be substantially different from the 
actual marginal tax rates for the individuals in the sample. Second, although the statistical 
analyses suggest a positive relationship between the marginal income tax rate and BMI, these 
relationships cannot be interpreted as causal. Solving the causality problem requires either a 
controlled experiment or fortuitous quasi-experimental design, which are not provided in this 
thesis. Third, the results of estimation presented in this chapter may be driven by omitted 
variables that could not be explicitly accounted for in the statistical models presented in this 
chapter. In short, this chapter demonstrates that there is a robust statistical association between 
the marginal income tax rate and the individual BMI values as predicted by the theoretical 
models presented in Chapters III and IV.  
 
 
 
 99 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
1. Introduction 
The scholars who study obesity agree that increased caloric intake combined with 
reduced physical activity leads to weight gain. There are, however, many reasons why people in 
the United States and other countries increased their caloric intake in recent decades. The 
research in medical and social sciences, therefore, focused on identifying the most important 
factors that led to rapid increase in prevalence of obesity. Policy makers and social activists in 
the US have used the findings in these studies to design public policies to tackle the problem of 
obesity. The implicit assumption in policy debates about obesity has been that the government’s 
tax policies have no adverse impact on obesity. This thesis attempts to bridge the gap between 
the academic investigations of obesity and the effectiveness of government in solving the 
problem by asking a simple question: How does the government’s income tax policy influence a 
rational individual’s decision to accumulate weight? 
The thesis consists of two major parts. The first part provides two theoretical models of 
how a rational individual allocates her limited money and time budget to consumption, work, and 
leisure activities. The first model is based on a simple labor-leisure tradeoff. The second model 
extends the first model by incorporating home production. Both models are based on the 
assumption that caloric density of foods and not volume affects weight. 
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The second major part of the thesis reports the results of statistical analyses of state-level and 
individual-level data on obesity and its potential correlates. 
 
2. Theoretical Models of Obesity 
This thesis presents a theoretical argument that the income tax may have unintended 
consequences on people's waistlines. One of the key assumptions in the theoretical models of 
obesity in the economics literature is that the volume of food consumption plays the most 
important role in weight gain. This thesis proposes models in which energy density rather than 
the volume of foods consumed is assumed to be the key factor in weight gain. The models are 
based on single period decision making where weight is a by-product of consuming high-density 
foods and sedentary leisure.  
The comparative static analysis in the first model discussed in Chapter III reveals that the 
marginal income tax has a non-linear effect on the optimal weight. The non-linearity arises from 
two sources. Substitution from energy dense foods to foods with low-energy density increases 
with income at an intermediate income level, and substitution does not take place at lower and 
higher levels of income. Furthermore, the model implies that time spent in sedentary activities, 
which contributes to weight gain, depends on the magnitudes of the income and substitution 
effects on the labor-leisure tradeoff. Put differently, a person whose decision to work is sensitive 
to change in wages will have a greater weight gain when the marginal tax rate rises.  
The comparative static analysis in the second model presented in Chapter IV shows that a 
higher marginal income tax rate increases the optimal weight for high and average income 
individuals. The model suggests that the effect of the marginal tax on weight for low income is 
unclear.  
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Both static models of weight choice indicate that the problem of weight gain is acute 
among low income individuals. Therefore, it may be wiser to develop policies that create 
opportunities for individuals to improve their material well-being, rather than trying to curb 
weight gain through taxation. 
 
3. Empirical Investigation 
The empirical evidence, both at the state and individual levels, suggests a positive 
association between the marginal income tax rate and BMI. The aggregated, state-level panel 
data regression estimates indicate that marginal income tax rate variation within states across 
time is positively associated with the percentage of obese people in the states. The coefficient on 
the marginal income tax rate ranges from 0.20 to 0.36. In all but one model specification, the 
coefficient estimate is statistically significant at conventional levels. Further robustness checks 
from the analysis of the BRFSS data with state-level marginal income tax rates, using multilevel 
mixed linear models, suggests that a positive relationship exists, but that it is non-linear. 
Including county-level covariates, the effect of the marginal income tax rate becomes statistically 
insignificant. The analysis of BRFSS data with simulated individual-level marginal income tax 
rates indicates a strong and positive statistical association between the marginal income tax rate 
and BMI. The effect appears to be more pronounced for females than for males. Furthermore, a 
quantile regression analysis shows that the effect of increasing income tax was greater at the 
upper quantiles of BMI for females as well as males.  
 
4. Future Research 
This thesis makes two contributions to the literature on obesity. First, it treats the 
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government’s policies as part of the individual’s relevant constraints. Second, the study attempts 
to integrate into a static behavioral model the findings in medical and nutrition sciences that 
caloric density and not volume of consumption affects weight gain. Future economic literature of 
obesity can benefit by formally modeling an individual’s decision over time with respect to 
weight by making a distinction between the volume and caloric density effects of consumption. 
Furthermore, future research can explore in greater detail how the marginal income tax rate 
affects BMI by employing a longitudinal dataset as it provides a superior sample to obtain more 
precise estimates and to make causal inference.  
In addition to the theoretical modeling and employing a richer dataset, this study warrants 
further investigation of the burden of the marginal income tax in monetary terms. One possible 
way to assess the cost of obesity arising from a higher taxes is to consider the BMI distribution 
under the status quo, then compare it to the hypothetical case when the marginal income tax rate 
increases by X percentage points for everyone in the sample. The resulting difference in these 
two distributions can be stated in terms of additional number of people who would be classified 
as obese. A rough estimate of the direct cost of obesity per person can then be derived by 
dividing the existing estimates of the total cost of obesity by the number of obese people in the 
US. By multiplying the direct cost of obesity per person by the additional number of obese 
people, this approach would generate an approximate monetary cost of obesity arising from a 
higher marginal income tax rate. 
Another direction for future research is to consider the effect of the marginal income tax 
in combination with sales taxes for food items on BMI. In recent years, several states and 
municipalities have proposed to tax sugary drinks in order to curb adult and childhood obesity in 
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the US.6 A richer model would combine individual-level dataset with a city-level and state-level 
tax dataset, in order to better estimate the impact of tax policies on obesity. 
Besides the energy intake side of the energy balance equation, future research can explore 
the relationship between physical activity and the marginal income tax. Currently, the literature 
relating labor supply decision and sedentary leisure is thin. One way to fill this gap is to use a 
similar approach taken in this thesis, and estimate a statistical relationship between the time 
spent in sedentary activities and the individual marginal income tax rate.  
  
                                                          
6
 Stateline. Retrieved April 23, 2011, from http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=476625. 
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Appendix: A 
Proposition 1. 
Proof.  In addition to the equality constraint (Equation (2)), there are two inequality constraints. 
The first inequality constraint requires θ ≤ 1 and the second one requires -θ ≤ 0. If θ = 0, this 
implies that the second inequality constraint is binding. Substituting 0 for θ into the first-order 
conditions (Equations (4)-(7)), I solve for the optimal values of M and L (Equations (8)-(9)). I 
substitute the optimal M and L back into Equation (4) and solve for the equality constraint 
multiplier λ. Finally, I solve for the second inequality constraint multiplier by substituting the 
optimal λ back into Equation (6). Since the second inequality constraint is binding, the 
complementary slackness implies that the Lagrange multiplier must be positive, which in turn 
implies that p2 > p1  and 2 3
2 1( )
p p
p pA w
β
α −+ > . 
 
Proposition 2. 
Proof. If θ = 1, this implies that the first inequality constraint is binding. Substituting 0 for θ into 
the first-order conditions (Equations (4)-(7)), I solve for the optimal values of M and L 
(Equations (8) and (9)). I substitute the optimal M and L back into Equation (4) and solve for the 
equality constraint multiplier λ.  
Finally, I solve for the second inequality constraint multiplier by substituting the optimal λ back 
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into Equation (6).Since the first inequality constraint is binding, the complementary slackness 
implies that the Lagrange multiplier must be positive, which in turn implies that p2 > p1  and 
3 2
2 1
[ (1 )]p pp pA w
β
α α−+ < − − . 
 
Proposition 3. 
Proof. If 0 < θ < 1, this implies that neither of the inequality constraints is binding and the 
Lagrange multipliers on inequality constraints are zero. Using the first-order conditions 
(Equations (4)-(7)), I solve for the optimal M, L, and θ. Since 0 < θ < 1, I rearrange the optimal 
solution for θ, and derive the conditions p2 > p1 and 3 2 32
2 1 2 1( )[ (1 )]
p p pp
p p p pA w
β β
α αα− −− − ≤ + ≤ . 
 
Proposition 4. 
Proof. The argument follows the same line of reasoning presented to prove Proposition 1. Since 
θ = 0, the effect of an income tax on weight is derived by first finding the optimal time used in 
leisure activities and then taking the first derivative of it with respect to the tax variable. The 
restriction θ = 0 implies that a higher income tax increases the optimal time spent in leisure 
activities, which in turn increases the optimal weight. 
 
Proposition 5.  
Proof. The argument follows the same line of reasoning presented to prove Proposition 2. Since 
θ = 1, the effect of an income tax on weight is found by taking the first derivative of the optimal 
time spent in leisure activities as well as the effect of consuming the high-density caloric foods 
βp₃.  
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Proposition 6. 
Proof. The argument follows the same line of reasoning presented to prove Proposition 3. Since 
0 < θ < 1, the effect of an income tax on weight is found by taking the first derivative of the 
optimal time spent in leisure activities, a relative share of the high-density caloric foods in total 
consumption of foods captured by the price differences p2 – p1, and the effect of consuming the 
high-density caloric foods βp₃. The restriction 0 < θ < 1 implies that the effect of an income tax 
on leisure is negative and large in magnitude compared to the increase in the relative share of the 
high-density caloric foods. 
 
Proposition 7. 
Proof. First, I solve Equation (32) for λ in terms of t. Then, I solve for all other choice variables 
in terms of t using the first-order conditions (Equations (29)-(31)). I substitute these solutions to 
the Equation (33) and find the optimal value of t in terms of exogenous parameters. Finally, I use 
the optimal value of t to solve for other choice variables in terms of exogenous parameters. 
 
Proposition 8. 
Proof. Equation (48) consists of four components. The first two terms reflect the change in 
weight as a result of changes in the optimal time used in leisure activities, and the last two terms 
reflect the change in weight as a result of changes in the optimal purchases of c2 and c1. Since, 
Equation (35) restricts the third term in Equation (48) to be positive, the sum of the last two 
terms has to be positive. The sum of the first two terms is positive if A > β3p3. 
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Appendix: B 
Random Intercept and Random Slope by State 
FIPS State   Intercept   Slope 
1 ALABAMA   29.81688   0.01141 
4 ARIZONA   29.47595   0.01579 
5 ARKANSAS   29.76797   0.01043 
6 CALIFORNIA   29.63873   0.01355 
8 COLORADO   29.01929   0.01908 
9 CONNECTICUT   29.47503   0.01518 
10 DELAWARE   30.46147   0.00634 
11 D.C.   30.04154   0.0074 
12 FLORIDA   29.33473   0.01504 
13 GEORGIA   29.40582   0.01618 
15 HAWAII   29.29285   0.01283 
16 IDAHO   29.89167   0.00675 
17 ILLINOIS   29.81039   0.00731 
18 INDIANA   30.21196   0.00506 
19 IOWA   29.87813   0.0119 
20 KANSAS   30.1397   0.00937 
21 KENTUCKY   29.99926   0.01024 
22 LOUISIANA   29.21504   0.01639 
23 MAINE   29.79629   0.01069 
24 MARYLAND   29.99976   0.01031 
25 MASSACHUSETTS 29.75561   0.01367 
26 MICHIGAN   30.34676   0.00499 
27 MINNESOTA   30.07596   0.00939 
28 MISSISSIPPI   29.66986   0.01297 
29 MISSOURI   30.23343   0.00434 
30 MONTANA   29.32771   0.01569 
31 NEBRASKA   30.45785   0.00634 
32 NEVADA   29.78749   0.01232 
33 NEW HAMPSHIRE 29.62567   0.01439 
34 NEW JERSEY   29.60852   0.01891 
35 NEW MEXICO   29.71885   0.01056 
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Random Intercept and Random Slope by State (Continued) 
State   Intercept   Slope 
36 NEW YORK   29.49954   0.01322 
37 NORTH CAROLINA 30.08134 0.00734 
38 NORTH DAKOTA 29.83587 0.01064 
39 OHIO   30.32513   0.0047 
40 OKLAHOMA   29.8669 0.01247 
41 OREGON   30.07337 0.00549 
42 PENNSYLVANIA 29.92408 0.00727 
44 RHODE ISLAND   29.72763 0.01221 
45 SOUTH CAROLINA 29.68663 0.0151 
46 SOUTH DAKOTA 29.91851 0.0081 
47 TENNESSEE   29.93988 0.01007 
48 TEXAS   30.19108 0.00425 
49 UTAH   29.58357 0.01308 
50 VERMONT   29.34064 0.013 
51 VIRGINIA   29.62826 0.01483 
53 WASHINGTON   30.08802 0.00871 
54 WEST VIRGINIA 30.16058 0.01017 
55 WISCONSIN   29.83051 0.01203 
56 WYOMING   30.01554 0.00978 
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